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Abstract 
This  paper  investigates  the  eﬀects  of  human  capital  on  productivity  using  micro 
panel  data  of  rural  households  in  the  North­West  Frontier  Province,  Pakistan,  where  a 
substantial  job  stratiﬁcation  is  observed  in  terms  of  income  and  education.  To  clarify 
the  mechanism  underlying  this  stratiﬁcation,  the  human  capital  eﬀects  are  estimated 
for  wages  (individual  level)  and  for  self­employed  activities  (household  level),  and  for 
farm  and  non­farm  sectors.  Estimation  results  show  a  clear  contrast  between  farm  and 
non­farm  sectors  —  wages  and  productivity  in  non­farm  activities  rise  with  education  at 
an  increasing  rate,  whereas  those  in  agriculture  respond  only  to  the  primary  education. 
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In  rural  areas  in  contemporary  developing  countries,  non­farm  activities  are  becoming  more 
important  in  determining  the  welfare  of  households  (Lanjouw  and  Lanjouw,  2001).  As  a 
result,  we  often  observe  job  stratiﬁcation  with  a  substantial  income  disparity  between  those 
who  were  successful  in  ﬁnding  non­farm,  lucrative  jobs  and  those  who  were  not.  Underlying 
this  stratiﬁcation  is  a  response  of  rural  households  in  labor  allocation  to  new  economic  op­
portunities,  considering  returns  to  human  capital,  which  may  diﬀer  from  activity  to  activity. 
When  farmers  decide  on  their  children’s  schooling,  they  are  usually  motivated  by  the  desire 
of  ﬁnding  non­farm,  lucrative  jobs  for  their  children.  Therefore,  investment  in  human  capital 
in  rural  areas  is  more  closely  related  with  non­farm  activities  (Huﬀman,  1980;  Yang,  1997; 
Fafchamps  and  Quisumbing,  1999;  Lanjouw,  1999;  Lanjouw  and  Lanjouw,  2001;  Yang  and 
An,  2002). 
This  paper  is  an  empirical  attempt  to  quantify  the  diﬀerence  of  returns  to  human 
capital  across  rural  activities.  Namely,  the  eﬀects  of  human  capital  on  farm  and  non­farm 
productivity  are  investigated  for  diﬀerent  educational  stages  and  for  diﬀerent  economic  activ­
ities,  using  micro  panel  data  of  rural  households  in  Pakistan’s  North­West  Frontier  Province 
(NWFP).  The  case  of  NWFP  is  particularly  interesting  because  the  weakness  of  economic 
development  in  South  Asia  is  concentrated  in  this  region  —  the  incidence  of  income  poverty 
is  high  and  the  deprivation  in  human  development  indicators  is  more  serious  than  indicated 
by  income  growth.  Another  reason  for  studying  NWFP  economy  is  the  general  paucity  of 
rigorous  economic  research  on  Pashtun  society,  which  spreads  over  NWFP  and  Afghanistan. 
The  major  contribution  of  this  paper  to  the  human  capital  literature  in  development 
economics  is  that  a  clear  contrast  between  sectors  and  between  employment  statuses  is  shown 
through  its  comprehensive  coverage  of  rural  activities  after  controlling  for  endogenous  selec­
tion.  This  study  is  one  of  the  few  studies  that  apply  the  methodology  of  selection  correction 
for  polychotomous  choice  models  to  datasets  from  developing  countries.1  The  rural  economic 
activities  are  broadly  classiﬁed  into  four:  non­agricultural  wage/salary  employment,  agricul­
tural  wage  employment,  non­agricultural  self­employment,  and  agricultural  self­employment. 
The  empirical  model  is  close  to  that  of  Yang  (1997),  who  estimated  non­linear  production 
functions  for  farm  value­added  and  linear  wage  functions  for  non­farm  wage  earnings.  Unlike 
Yang  (1997),  however,  this  paper  attempts  to  include  non­farm  enterprises  and  agricultural 
1See  Glewwe  and  Jacoby  (1994)  for  such  an  example  applied  to  schooling  decisions  in  developing  countries. 
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wages  and  to  incorporate  non­linear  impacts  corresponding  to  educational  stages. 
To  investigate  the  diﬀerence  according  to  economic  sectors,  i.e.,  agriculture  vs.  non­
agriculture,  comparable  models  of  returns  to  human  capital  are  estimated  for  all  sectors  that 
are  relevant  for  rural  households  when  they  allocate  labor  force.  In  the  recent  literature, 
Jolliﬀe  (2002)  estimated  the  eﬀects  of  several  alternative  measures  of  household  education 
on  household  income,  diﬀerentiated  into  farm  and  non­farm  income.  This  paper  adopts  more 
detailed  decomposition  of  household  income  sources  than  he  did. 
In  characterizing  returns  to  human  capital  in  the  rural  setting  of  developing  countries, 
due  attention  should  be  paid  to  the  importance  of  self­employment  (Newman  and  Gertler, 
1994).  Therefore,  this  paper  examines  carefully  how  the  education  eﬀects  on  productivity dif­
fer  according  to  employment  status,  i.e.,  the  wage  level  vs.  the  productivity  of  self­employed 
enterprises.  Among  recent  studies,  Nielsen  and  Westerg˚ ard­Nielsen  (2001)  estimated  the 
eﬀect  of  education  on  individual  earnings,  diﬀerentiated  into  wage  and  self­employment  in­
come  sources.  This  paper  is  distinguished  from  their  work  by  allowing  returns  to  labor  to 
be  non­linear,  diﬀerentiating  returns  to  labor  from  returns  to  assets  used  in  self­employed 
activities,  and  imputing  income  from  consumption  of  own  farm  products  properly. 
Another  contribution  of  this  paper  is  to  give  a  clue  to  the  controversy  regarding  the 
eﬀects  of  education  on  farm  productivity.  Since  Schultz  (1961)  emphasized  the  role  of  educa­
tion  in  improving  farm  eﬃciency  and  in  modernizing  agriculture,  microeconometric  studies 
to  test  his  hypothesis  have  been  accumulated,  showing  mixed  results  from  developing  coun­
tries  (Lockheed  et  al.,  1980;  Jamison  and  Lau,  1982;  Yang,  1998).  In  the  case  of  rural 
Pakistan,  Fafchamps  and  Quisumbing  (1999)  found  that  private  returns  to  education  in 
farming  are  insigniﬁcant,  whereas  Kurosaki  and  Fafchamps  (2002)  demonstrated  that  the 
eﬀects  of  schooling  years  on  crop  yields  per  acre  are  signiﬁcantly  positive.  Why  have  some 
studies  found  positive  eﬀects  of  education  on  farm  productivity  while  others  have  not?  This 
paper  gives  one  possible  answer  by  allowing  the  eﬀects  of  education  to  diﬀer  across  diﬀerent 
levels  of  education  and  at  diﬀerent  aggregation  levels  of  farm  activities.  It  is  found  that  the 
eﬀect  of  education  is  stronger  at  more  aggregate  levels,  suggesting  the  importance  of  human 
capital  for  eﬃcient  factor  allocation  within  a  farm. 
The  paper  is  organized  as  follows.  Section  2 describes  the  key  features  of  labor  allocation 
and  educational  achievement  in  the  study  area.  Section  3  proposes  empirical  models  to 
quantify  the  eﬀects  of  education  on  productivity.  Section  4  shows  estimation  results  for  the 
four  broadly  classiﬁed  activities.  Section  5  concludes  the  paper. 
2 2  Data  and  Key  Features  Identiﬁed  in  the  Field 
2.1  Data 
This  paper  employs  a  panel  dataset  compiled  from  a  sample  household  survey  implemented  in 
1996  and  1999  in  three  villages  in  the  Peshawar  District  of  Pakistan’s  NWFP.  NWFP  is  one 
of  the  four  provinces  of  Pakistan.  Compared  with  Punjab,  which  is  the  center  of  agriculture 
and  related  industries,  and  Sind,  where  the  metropolitan  city  of  Karachi  is  located,  NWFP 
and  Baluchistan  could  be  characterized  as  economically  backward  provinces.  The  incidence 
of  income  poverty (headcount  index)  in  rural  NWFP  is  estimated  at  46.5%  in  1998/99  (World 
Bank,  2002),  which  is  the  highest  in  Pakistan. 
Since  NWFP  is  a  relatively  land­scarce  province  with  limited  scope  for  agriculture­
led  sustained  growth,  human  capital  is  expected  to  play  a  more  important  role  in  poverty 
eradication.  Yet,  even  in  terms  of  human  development,  the  province  is  behind  the  other  two 
provinces.  Literacy  rates  in  NWFP,  especially  of  females,  are  much  lower  than  in  Sind  and 
Punjab,  and  NWFP  is  lagging  behind  Punjab  and  Sind  in  infant  mortality  rates  also.  This 
disparity,  i.e.,  human  development  poverty  being  more  serious  than  income/consumption 
poverty,  is  a  notorious  characteristic  of  South  Asia  as  well  as  Pakistan,  to  which  various 
issues  of  UNDP’s  Human  Development  Reports  drew  attention.  This  paper  focuses  on  rural 
NWFP  because  this  is  a  region  where  this  disparity  is  stark. 
Details  of  the  ﬁrst  survey  are  given  by  Kurosaki  and  Hussain  (1999)  and  those  of 
the  second  survey  are  given  by  Kurosaki  and  Khan  (2001).  The  reference  period  for  each 
survey  is  ﬁscal  years  1995/96  and  1998/99  respectively. 2  In  choosing  sample  villages  in  1996, 
we  controlled  for  village  size,  socio­historical  background,  and  tenancy  structure.  At  the 
same  time,  to  ensure  that  the  cross  section  data  thus  generated  would  provide  dynamic 
implications,  we  carefully  chose  villages  with  diﬀerent  levels  of  economic  development.  The 
ﬁrst  criterion  was  agricultural  technology.  One  of  the  three  sample  villages  was  rainfed, 
another  semi­irrigated,  while  the  other  was  fully­irrigated.  Another  criterion  was  that  the 
selected  villages  be  located  along  the  rural­urban  continuum  so  that  it  would  be  possible 
to  decipher  the  subsistence  versus  market  orientation  of  farming  communities  in  the  study 
area. 
Table  1  summarizes  characteristics  of  the  sample  villages.  Village  A  is  rainfed  and 
is  located  some  distance  from  main  roads.  This  village  serves  as  an  example  of  the  least 
2Pakistan’s  ﬁscal  year  as  well  as  its  agricultural  year  is  the  period  from  July  1  to  June  30. 
3 developed  villages.  Village  C  is  fully  irrigated  and  is  located  close  to  a  national  highway, 
so  serves  as  an  example  of  the  most  developed  villages.  Village  B  is  in  between.  Sample 
households  in  each  village  were  selected  randomly  from  each  type  of  household  classiﬁed  by 
their  farm  operating  status:  non­farm  households  (with  no  operated  land  for  cropping)3  and 
farm  households  that  include  owner,  owner­cum­tenant,  and  pure  tenant  farm  households. 
The  distinction  among  farm  households  enables  us  to  decipher  the  eﬀects  of  land  assets  on 
household  welfare. 
Out  of  355  households  surveyed  in  1996,  304  were  resurveyed  in  1999.  The  most  frequent 
reason  for  attrition  was  migration.  Some  households  have  migrated  out  from  the  village  and 
others  have  sent  all  their  adult  males  to  work  in  foreign  countries  or  in  Pakistani  cities. 
Among  those  resurveyed,  three  had  been  divided  into  multiple  households,  resulting  in  the 
total  number  of  resurveyed  households  in  1999  as  309.4  In  1999,  additional  43  households 
were  also  surveyed  as  “replacement”  samples.  This  paper,  therefore,  employs  an  unbalanced 
panel  of  398  households,  of  which  301  are  re­surveyed  households  without  household  division 
and  299  are  those  panel  households  with  complete  and  comparable  information.5 
Table  1  also  shows  characteristics  of  the  panel  households.  Average  household  sizes  are 
larger  in  Village  A  than  in  Villages  B  and  C,  reﬂecting  the  stronger  prevalence  of  an  extended 
family  system.  Average  landholding  sizes  are  also  larger  in  Village  A  than  in  Villages  B  and 
C.  Since  the  productivity  of  purely  rainfed  land  is  substantially  lower  than  that  of  irrigated 
land,  eﬀective  landholding  sizes  are  comparable  among  the  three  villages.  As  is  shown  in 
the  average  household  income  or  consumption  per  capita,  the  living  standard  is  the  lowest 
in  Village  A  and  the  highest  in  Village  C.6 
In  the  sample  villages,  yields  of  wheat  (staple  food)  are  not  only  low  on  average  (the 
overall  mean  was  690  kg/ha  in  the  unirrigated  village  and  1,760  kg/ha  in  the  irrigated  vil­
3“Non­farm”  households  are  deﬁned  by  the  land  operation  status.  Therefore,  several  households  who  did 
not  operate  any  land  but  worked  as  farm  laborers  for  wage  or  kept  livestock  are  classiﬁed  as  “non­farm” 
households. 
4In  the  survey,  a  household  is  deﬁned  as  a  unit  of  coresidence  and  shared  consumption.  A  typical  joint 
family  in  the  region,  where  married  sons  live  together  with  the  household  head  who  owns  their  family  land 
along  with  their  wives  and  children,  is  treated  as  one  household  as  long  as  they  share  a  kitchen.  When  the 
household  head  dies  or  becomes  aged,  the  land  may  be  distributed  among  sons,  who  start  to  live  separately 
on  that  occasion.  In  our  survey  when  we  encounter  such  cases,  each  family  of  each  son  is  counted  as  one 
household. 
5See  Appendix  2  for  the  determinants  of  attrition. 
6During  the  three  years  since  the  ﬁrst  survey,  Pakistan’s  economy  suﬀered  from  macro­economic  stagnation 
with  rising  poverty  (World  Bank,  2002),  which  hurt  the  NWFP  economy  the  most  severely.  Reﬂecting  these 
macroeconomic  shocks,  the  general  living  standard  declined  in  the  study  villages  during  the  period  of  this 
study. 
4 lages)  but  also  ﬂuctuate  widely.  The  share  of  wheat  consumption  met  from  own  production 
was  less  than  30%  in  the  rainfed  village  (Village  A)  where  wheat  yield  is  the  lowest.  Even 
in  Villages  B  and  C  where  wheat  yields  are  higher,  the  average  percentage  was  low,  in  the 
range  from  20  to  47%  (Kurosaki  and  Hussain,  1999).  This  situation  is  attributable  to  the 
low  productivity  of  wheat  in  Village  A  and  the  meager  size  of  land  holding  in  Villages  B  and 
C.  In  the  study  area,  however,  grain  markets  are  well  developed,  where  wheat  is  available 
throughout  the  year  at  stable  prices  thanks  to  public  intervention  (Kurosaki,  1996).  There­
fore,  marginal  farmers  would  be  better  oﬀ  with  higher  food  security  by  growing  vegetables 
on  their  land  and  by  increasing  non­farm  employment,  rather  than  by  growing  wheat  to  the 
limit  on  their  marginal  land. 
2.2  Labor  Force  Allocation  and  Human  Capital 
Information  on  personal  details  was  collected  from  every  household  member  and  every  fam­
ily  member  who  remitted  regularly  to  the  household.  The  information  includes  age,  sex, 
educational  background,  regular  working  status,  primary  occupation,  secondary  occupation, 
average  monthly  wages/earnings  from  employment,  and  so  on. 
Table  2  shows  the  distribution  of  working  household  members  by  their  employment 
status.  From  those  household  members  whose  age  is  15  years  and  above,  students,  retired 
people,  and  the  unemployed  are  excluded,  giving  the  total  number  of  working  members  at 
1,591  for  the  total  355  households  in  1996  and  1,606  for  the  total  352  households  in  1999.7 
Based  on  each  individual’s  primary  occupation,  the  table  classiﬁes  the  employment  status 
into  ﬁve  categories:  household  work,  non­agricultural  wage/salary  employment,  agricultural 
wage  employment,  non­agricultural  self­employment,  and  agricultural  self­employment. 
Agriculture  is  traditionally  the  most  important  source  of  employment  in  the  study 
region.  Because  there  are  few  large  scale  farms  that  are  completely  dependent  on  hired 
labor,  most  of  those  engaged  in  agriculture  are  self­employed.  Their  labor  is  sometimes 
supplemented  by  hired  labor.  Non­agricultural  self­employment  activities,  or  non­farm  en­
terprises,  are  diverse:  traditional,  caste­based  services  in  rural  South  Asia  such  as  carpenters, 
barbers,  and  blacksmiths  (approximately  13%  of  the  individuals  self­employed  in  non­farm 
enterprises);  low­capital,  low­end  jobs  such  as  snack  hawkers  and  shoe  polishers  (15%);  and 
7Below  the  age  of  15,  no  female  children  were  reported  to  have  primary  occupation,  while  37  male  children, 
aged  10­14,  or  8.4%  of  that  age  group,  were  associated  with  primary  occupation.  Among  them,  10  worked 
on  their  parents’  farm,  four  on  their  parents’  non­agricultural  enterprises,  two  on  others’  farms,  and  21  were 
employed  in  non­agricultural  wage  jobs,  mostly  in  low­paid  sectors. 
5 those  that  require  relatively  large  initial  capital  such  as  arms  trading,  general  shops,  wheat 
mills,  and  nursery  shops  (57%).  Transportation  service  is  also  common  (15%),  which  cov­
ers  all  three  types  listed  above.  Non­agricultural  wage/salary  employment  are  also  diverse, 
including  daily  construction  work,  wage  employment  in  those  listed  as  non­agricultural  self­
employment  activities,  and  oﬃce/shop  work  in  the  nearby  towns.  Since  the  size  of  estab­
lishments  is  universally  small  for  those  employees,  we  may  classify  them  according  to  their 
contract  duration  —  approximately  55%  of  the  non­farm  employees  were  hired  casually  on 
daily  basis,  while  the  rest  were  hired  regularly. 
Among  males,  employment  in  non­agriculture  and  self­employment  in  agriculture  are 
more  frequently  found  than  the  other  two.  The  concentration  of  female  workers  on  the 
category  “household  work”  reﬂects  the  eﬀects  of  purdah,  the  custom  of  social  seclusion  of 
women  in  South  Asia.  The  custom  is  maintained  more  strictly  in  rural  NWFP  where  Pashtun 
codes  of  maintaining  family  honor  reinforce  it  (Ahmed,  1980).  Because  of  the  prevalence  of 
purdah,  male  household  heads  in  the  study  area  prefer  female  family  members  not  to  work 
outside;  when  the  female  members  work  domestically  in  productive  activities,  the  heads  do 
not  recognize  their  work  as  economically  productive  unless  they  are  engaged  in  the  marketing 
stage  also,  which  is  very  rare.  As  a  result,  the  number  of  female  household  members  who 
are  engaged  in  “household  work”  is  abnormally  high  in  Table  2.8  Because  of  this  distortion, 
we  focus  only  on  male  labor  allocation  and  the  eﬀects  of  human  capital  on  it  in  the  following 
analysis. 
Panel  B  of  Table  2  shows  the  level  and  composition  of  household  income  corresponding 
to  the  labor  allocation  in  Panel  A.  The  average  household  income  excluding  transfers  and 
remittances  is  approximately  Rs.  70,500,  or  US$  1,800,  for  the  average  household  size  of 
9.4  members  in  1996.  The  corresponding  ﬁgure  for  1999  is  approximately  Rs.  61,800,  or 
US$  1,300.  Consumption  declined  less  than  income  did,  indicating  that  households  have 
ex  post  measures  to  cope  with  income  risk  (Kurosaki,  forthcoming).  The  majority  of  the 
sample  households  are  estimated  to  lie  close  to  or  below  the  poverty  line  (Kurosaki  and 
Hussain,  1999;  Kurosaki  and  Khan,  2001).  The  composition  shares  show  that  the  earning 
from  non­agricultural  employment  is  the  most  important  one,  followed  by  self­employment 
in  agriculture  and  self­employment  in  non­agriculture.  Therefore,  the  average  income  per 
There  were  15  cases  of  females  employed  by  others  for  non­farm  work.  Among  them,  11  were  hired 
casually  (ﬁve  in  construction  and  six  in  unspeciﬁed  works  including  domestic  services)  and  four  were  hired 
regularly  (three  in  low­paid  jobs  and  one  with  monthly,  moderate  salary). 
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worker  in  non­farm  self­employment  is  highest,  followed  by  that  in  wage  employment  in  non­
agriculture.  The  average  income  per  worker  in  agriculture,  whether  it  is  self­employment  or 
a  wage  job,  is  much  lower  than  those  in  non­agriculture,  suggesting  a  job  stratiﬁcation  with 
a  substantial  income  disparity.  Then  what  determines  the  job  stratiﬁcation  among  these 
four  activities? 
This  paper  attributes  the  answer  to  a  diﬀerence  in  returns  to  human  capital  in  rural 
economic  activities.  Information  on  age  and  educational  achievement  is  shown  in  Table  3, 
for  the  same  working  males  described  in  Table  2.  The  average  age  was  36.0  in  1996  and 
34.6  in  1999.  The  educational  achievement  is  shown  in  two  diﬀerent  forms.  Schooling  years 
correspond  to  a  standard  variable  in  Mincerian  models  of  economic  returns  to  education.9  To 
capture  non­linear  eﬀects  of  education  associated  with  educational  stages,  a  series  of  dummy 
variables  are  also  compiled,  with  no  education  as  a  reference  group.  Among  these  dummy 
variables,  the  average  of  the  literacy  dummies  that  correspond  to  primary  school  education 
or  above  is  reported  in  Table  3.  These  numbers  show  that  educational  achievement  of  sample 
households  is  indeed  low  —  the  average  schooling  was  3.7  years  in  1996  and  4.0  years  in  1999; 
literacy  rate  was  43%  in  1996  and  48%  in  1999.10 
The  relationship  between  employment  status  and  human  capital  variables  is  also  sum­
marized  in  Table  3.  The  self­employed  are  older  than  employees  and  those  working  in  agri­
culture  are  older  than  those  in  non­agriculture.  The  diﬀerence  in  educational  achievement 
is  more  signiﬁcant  between  agricultural  vs.  non­agricultural  jobs  than  between  employment 
vs.  self­employment  —  those  engaged  in  non­agricultural  jobs  are  generally  more  educated 
than  those  engaged  in  agricultural  jobs. 
9To  reﬂect  the  fact  that  repetition  is  common  in  the  study  area  and  skipping  is  also  possible  for  bright 
students  (Hoodbhoy,  1998;  Sawada  and  Lokshin,  2001),  years  measured  in  Pakistan’s  standardized  education 
system  were  used  in  converting  completed  grades  into  completed  years  of  education.  Up  to  the  twelfth  grade, 
the  system  is  standardized  as  follows:  primary  education  of  ﬁve  years  beginning  from  the  age  of  ﬁve  or  six, 
either  by  primary  or  mosque  schools;  midd le  education  of  three  years;  secondary  education  of  two  years;  higher 
secondary  education  of  two  years.  After  completing  the  twelfth  grade  and  passing  the  “intermediate”  FA/FSc 
degree  examination,  degree  classes  are  taught  at  universities  and  colleges  with  various  years  of  instruction 
depending  on  the  specialization  (Hoodbhoy,  1998). 
Achievement  in  female  education  is  much  lower  than  that  for  males  reported  here.  In  1996,  average 
schooling  was  0.5  years  and  the  literacy  rate  was  7.6%  for  female  counterparts  (Kurosaki,  2001).  As  Sawada 
and  Lokshin  (2001)  showed,  the  gender  gap  in  education  is  more  inﬂuenced  by  the  gender  gap  in  the  initial 
enrollment  into  primary  education.  In  our  case  also,  the  gender  gap  in  the  average  schooling  years  becomes 
much  smaller  when  only  those  who  completed  primary  education  are  compared. 
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3  Empirical  Speciﬁcation 
The  descriptive  analysis  above  suggests  that  rural  non­agricultural  activities  are  associated 
with  higher  earnings  per  worker  and  higher  education  levels  of  male  workers  involved.  To 
investigate  whether  or  not  this  association  can  be  explained  by  a  diﬀerence  in  returns  to 
human  capital,  this  section  proposes  empirical  models  that  are  comparable  between  the 
four  rural  activities  and  control  for  endogenous  selection  of  the  activities.  Before  presenting 
empirical  speciﬁcations,  a  brief  discussion  on  the  theory  would  help  in  aligning  the  issue  of 
labor  allocation  with  that  of  returns  to  human  capital. 
3.1  A  Theoretical  Model  of  Labor  Allocation 
We  assume  a  unitary  decision  making  process  at  the  household  level  with  respect  to  labor 
allocation,  following  the  model  by  Newman  and  Gertler  (1994).  A  risk­neutral  household  al­
locates  labor  from  household  members  (i  = 1, ..., N),  from  which  it  obtains  disposable  income 
y.  From  leisure  enjoyed  by  household  members,  the  household  obtains  utility  v(l1, l2, ..., lN), 
where  v(.)  is  a  concave  function,  which  is  separable  from  utility  from  income  y.  This  spec­
iﬁcation  implicitly  assumes  that  the  household  uses  a  two­stage  decision  making  process 
with  respect  to  consumption  of  non­leisure  goods—in  the  ﬁrst  stage,  it  only  allocates  re­
sources  between  household  consumption  and  leisure;  it  allocates  household  consumption 
among  members  in  the  second  stage  based  on  the  level  of  y. We  treat  y  as  a  num´ eraire  so 
that  net  returns  to  labor  are  denoted  in  real  terms. 
The  household  faces  a  budget  constraint  and  N  time  constraints,  one  for  each  member. 
Each  member  can  potentially  enter  into  M  economic  activities,  each  of  which  yields  a  net 
return  to  labor  fj.  More  formally,  the  household’s  optimization  is  expressed  as 
max 
Lij 
y  +  v(l1, l2, ..., lN),  (1) 
subject  to  the  budget  constraint 
M � 
y0  +  fj(L1j, L2j, ..., LNj;Xj) =  y,  (2) 
j=1 
time  constraints 
M � 
Lij  +  li  =  Ti,  i  =  1, ..., N,  (3) 
j=1 
and  non­negativity  conditions  for  labor  allocation  variables  (y0  is  a  non­labor  income  includ­
ing  the  sum  of  returns  to  household  assets,  Lij  is  hours  of  work  by  individual  i  in  activity 
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j,  which  is  constrained  as  non­negative,  Xj  in  constraint  (2)  is  a  vector  of  quasi­ﬁxed  enter­
prise  input  such  as  land,  ﬁxed  capital,  household  human  capital  composition,  etc.,  and  Ti  in 
constraint  (3)  is  the  time  endowment  for  individual  i). 
The  ﬁrst  order  conditions  for  the  optimization  consist  of  the  following  Kuhn­Tucker 
(M  × N) equations 
Lij  ≥ 0, 
∂fj  ∂v 
≤ 0, Lij 








A  suﬃcient  condition  for  the  Kuhn­Tucker  conditions  (4)  when  household  member  i  works 
can  be  expressed  as: 
Lik  >  0  and  Lij  = 0  if 
∂fk  > 
∂fj  ,  ∀j =  k.  (5)
∂Lik  ∂Lij 
�
These  expressions  show  that  the  principle  of  household  labor  allocation  is  compara­
tive  advantages  determined  by  the  marginal  returns  to  labor  ∂fj/∂Lij.  For  example,  when 
a  household  member  can  earn  more  as  a  non­agricultural  employee  than  in  agricultural 
self­employment  or  than  in  household  work,  the  household  allocates  him/her  to  the  non­
agricultural  employment  even  if  the  absolute  level  of  his/her  marginal  contribution  to  self­
employed  farming  is  higher  than  those  of  other  household  members.  Although  this  property 
is  derived  from  a  unitary  household  model,  equation  (5)  could  be  derived  from  a  class  of 
household  models  that  belong  to  a  Pareto­eﬃcient  bargaining  models  without  uncertainty. 
Therefore,  the  empirical  part  of  this  paper  focuses  on  the  shape  of  ∂fj/∂Lij  as  a  function  of 
human  capital. 
3.2  Introducing  Risk  Aversion 
Agriculture  is  risky,  especially  crop  farming  in  Village  A,  which  is  not  irrigated.  The  average 
wheat  output  per  acre  was  only  700kg/ha  in  Village  A  in  1996  and  the  coeﬃcient  of  variation 
among  farmers  is  also  large  at  67  to  81%  (Kurosaki  and  Hussain,  1999,  Table  7).  Low  average 
and  high  variability  characterize  rainfed  agriculture.  In  the  survey,  we  collected  information 
on  the  household  head’s  subjective  assessment  on  adjustment  to  economic  risk.  From  their 
responses,  it  was  found  that  once  households  are  hit  by  a  bad  luck,  the  majority  of  them 
have  neither  suﬃcient  assets  in  monetary  or  in  any  liquid  form  nor  access  to  formal  credit 
markets;  they  therefore  turn  to  reciprocal,  informal  credits  among  relatives  and  friends  if  they 
are  fortunate  enough  to  have  such  relations;  otherwise,  they  simply  cut  their  consumption 
(Kurosaki  and  Hussain,  1999,  Table  13). 
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Considering  the  inherent  income  risk  faced  by  the  sample  households  and  their  limited 
access  to  formal  insurance  and  credit  markets,  it  is  possible  that  households  pay due  attention 
to  the  riskiness  of  each economic  activity when  they  allocate  their  labor  force.  The  theoretical 
model  of  Section  3.1  in  a  simple  static  framework  can  be  extended  with  risk  aversion  behavior. 
We  implicitly  assume  two  seasons:  in  the  ﬁrst  season,  a  household  determines  labor 
allocation  among  household  members;  in  the  second,  it  enjoys  consumption  based  on  the 
realized  amount  of  returns  to  labor  and  other  household  assets.  Household’s  ex  post  welfare 
is  represented  by  a  utility  function  v(l1,l2,..., lN) +  u(y),  where  v(.)  is  the  same  as  before 
and  u(.)  is  now  a  strictly  concave  function  of  y  (num´ eraire).  Since  l  and  y  are  consumed  in 
diﬀerent  seasons,  separability  is  assumed. 
The  household  maximizes  the  expected  utility,  i.e.,  v(l1,l2,..., lN)+E[u(y)],  with  respect 
to  Lij,  subject  to  the  same  constraints  in  equations  (2),  (3),  and  non­negativity  conditions. 
The  ﬁrst  order  conditions  then  become 
∂v  ∂v 





≤ 0, Lij  E[u�(y) 





To  investigate  the  eﬀects  of  risk  and  risk  aversion  on  labor  force  allocation,  we  approx­
imate  u�(y)  by  its  ﬁrst­order  Taylor  expansion  (Kurosaki  and  Fafchamps,  2002): 
u�(y) ≈ u�(E[y])  +  u��(E[y])(y − E[y])  =  u�(E[y])[1  − R(y − E[y])/E[y]],  (7) 
where  R  is  an  Arrow­Pratt  coeﬃcient  of  relative  risk  aversion  evaluated  at  E[y].  Inserting  the 
above  approximation  into  the  ﬁrst  order  condition  in  (6),  we  obtain  its  suﬃcient  condition 
corresponding  to  equation  (5)  as 
Lik  >  0  and  Lij  = 0  if 
� �  � � � �  � � 











where  Cov(x, y) denotes  the  covariance  between  x  and  y. 
Equation  (8)  implies  that  the  household  decision  price  for  labor  allocation  is  now  the 
sum  of  marginal  returns  to  labor  and  a  discount  for  the  riskiness  of  each  activity.  For 
example,  suppose  a  case  when  activity  1  is  the  least  proﬁtable  on  average  among  the  four 
but  is  associated  with  the  lowest  income  risk.  If  this  is  the  case,  the  household  would  allocate 
its  labor  force  to  activity  1  when  the  household  is  suﬃciently  risk­averse  (suﬃciently  high 
R)  or  other  activities  are  suﬃciently  risky.  Unlike  equation  (5),  equation  (8)  might  not 
be  applicable  to  Pareto­eﬃcient  bargaining  models  under  risk,  because  R’s  of  such  models 
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are  likely  to  vary  for  each  individual,  reﬂecting  individual  members’  risk  preferences  and 
bargaining  rules. 
One  caveat  is  that  equation  (8)  is  much  stronger  than  equation  (6).  With  risk  aversion 
and  non­linearity  in  marginal  returns  to  labor  in  self­employment,  it  is  likely  that  the  same 
individual  is  allocated  to  multiple  activities,  when  returns  to  these  activities  are  negatively 
correlated.  The  issue  of  multiple  jobs  at  the  individual  level  is  worth  further  study. 
3.3  An  Empirical  Model  of  Labor  Allocation 
As  shown  above,  eﬃcient  allocation  of  household  labor  force  requires  that  the  factor  be  allo­
cated  based  on  a  comparative  advantage  principle.  For  example  if  the  household’s  objective 
is  to  maximize  expected  income,  when  a  household  member  can  earn  more  as  a  non­farm  em­
ployee  than  in  other  activities,  he/she  is  allocated  to  the  non­farm  employment  even  he/she 
is  a  better  farmer  than  other  household  members.  If  the  household’s  objective  is  to  maximize 
expected  utility  incorporating  labor­leisure  choice  and  risk  aversion,  the  comparative  advan­
tage  should  be  adjusted  based  on  subjective  equilibrium  prices,  which  could  diverge  from  the 
market  returns  to  labor  of  each  family  member.  Explanatory  variables  for  a  reduced­form 
function  of  the  optimal  labor  allocation  thus  include  household  and  individual  attributes 
determining  marginal  productivity  of  the  labor  force  and  the  household’s  consumption  and 
risk  preferences. 
With  additional  assumption  that  the  household  utility  associated  with  allocating  indi­
vidual  i  to  activity  j  has  a  non­stochastic  component  and  a  stochastic  term  with  extreme­
value  distribution,  the  labor  allocation  can  be  characterized  by  a  multinomial  logit  model 
(McFadden,  1974).  We  specify  the  multinomial  logit  model  as 
exp(Xitγj1  +  Xhtγj2)
Prob(zit  =  j) =  � 
k=0,1,2,3,4  exp(Xitγk1  +  Xhtγk2)
, j  = 0,1,2,3,4,  (9) 
and  estimate  it  in  the  ﬁrst  stage  of  our  empirical  analysis,  where  zit  is  an  indicator  variable 
denoting  the  choice  for  individual  i  in  household  h  with  respect  to  j  in  year  t,  Xit  is  a  vector 
of  individual  attributes  such  as  education  and  age,  Xht  is  a  vector  of  household  attributes 
such  as  household  wealth  and  production  assets,  and  γj1  and  γj2  are  vectors  of  coeﬃcients  to 
be  estimated,  associated  with  choice  j  (household  work  =  0,  non­agricultural  wage  employee 
=  1,  agricultural  wage  employee  =  2,  non­agricultural  self­employed  =  3,  and  agricultural 
self­employed  =  4).11 
11Another  approach  is  to  model  sequential  decision  making  in  which  the  household  allocates  its  member  i 
11
� 
The  multinomial  logit  model  can  be  estimated  by  a  maximum  likelihood  method.  Then, 
ˆ the  ﬁtted  probability of  individual  i  working  in  activity j,  Prob(zit  =  j) is  given  by expression 
(9)  with  γj1  and  γj2  replaced  by  their  estimates  ˆ γj2.  Similarly,  the  ﬁtted  probability  γj1  and  ˆ
of  household  h  with  its  member(s)  working  in  activity  j  is  given  by 
ˆ 
�  =j  exp(Xit ˆ γk2) k γk1  +  Xht ˆ
Prob(zht  =  j) = 1 −  �
�
k  exp(Xit ˆ γk2) 
.  (10)
γk1  +  Xht ˆ
i∈h 
These  ﬁtted  values  are  used  to  calculate  selection  terms  in  the  second­stage  estimation  ex­
plained  below. 
3.4  Determinants  of  Wage 
Assuming  wage  labor  markets  to  be  exogenous  to  household  decisions,  the  unit  wage  becomes 
a  function  of  the  human  capital  of  the  employee,  Xit.  To  capture  this  idea,  a  standard  Mincer 
equation  is  estimated  in  which  ln Wijt  is  regressed  on  Xit,  where  Wijt  is  the  wage  level  of 
individual  i  working  in  activity  j  (=1,  2),  in  year  t. 
Two  econometric  issues  are  addressed  in  this  paper.  The  ﬁrst  is  sample  selection. 
Because  Wijt  is  observed  only  when  individual  i  works  in  j  =  1  or  2,  an  error  term  to 
the  Mincer  equation  conditional  on  this  selection  has  non­zero  mean.  To  control  for  this, 
a  two­stage  procedure  is  adopted  in  which a  correction  term ˆ λijt  compiled  from  estimation 
results  of  equation  (9)  is  added  as  an  additional  regressor.12  Assuming  that  the  error  term 
to  the  wage  equation  is  distributed  normally,  we  adopt  the  correction  term  based  on  the 
general  transformation  of  error  terms  to  normality (Lee,  1983),  because  it  facilitates  a  feasible 
computation  of  a  selection  term  for  the  household­level  regression  in  the  next  subsection. 
λijt  ≡ 
φ[Φ−1[ ˆ
The  correction  term  is  deﬁned  as ˆ
ˆ 
Prob(zit=j)]] ,  where  φ[.] and  Φ[.] are  density  and 
Prob(zit=j) 
ˆ distribution  functions  for  a  standard  normal  variable  and  Prob(zit  =  j) is  obtained  from  the 
ﬁrst­stage  multinomial  logit  model.  If  at  least  one  variable  in  Xh  in  (9)  does  not  aﬀect  wages 
directly  but  aﬀects  it  indirectly  through  the  activity  choice,  the  second­stage  wage  regression 
is  identiﬁed. 
Another  econometric  issue  is  unobserved  characteristics  that  aﬀect  wages  received  by 
those  who  work  in  the  wage  sector.  An  example  is  worker’s  ability  that  is  known  to  the 
to  the  wage  sector  versus  the  self­employment  sector  in  the  ﬁrst  stage  and  then  allocates  him  to  agriculture 
or  non­agriculture  in  the  second  stage  conditional  on  the  choice  made  in  the  ﬁrst  stage.  The  ﬁrst­stage  choice 
can be  modeled  in  a  multinomial  probit  framework  as  well,  in  which  the  axiom  of  independence  of  irrelevant 
alternatives  can  be  relaxed.  Relaxing  the  assumption  that  the  choices  are  exclusive  is  also  worth  exploring, 
since  several  individuals  have  secondary  jobs  as  well  (see  note  2  of  Table  2).  Robustness  of  our  results  with 
respect  to  these  approaches  is  left  for  a  future  investigation. 
12This  procedure  enables  us  to  obtain  consistent  estimates,  although  they  are  not  fully  eﬃcient. 
12 household  but  not  observable  to  the  econometrician.  To  minimize  the  bias  from  omitting 
these  unobservable  variables,  a  household  speciﬁc  eﬀect,  αh,  is  added  to  the  wage  regression. 
With  household  panel  data,  we  can  control  for  αh  by  either  ﬁxed  or  random  eﬀect  speciﬁ­
cation.  Since  the  ﬁxed  eﬀect  speciﬁcation  may  exaggerate  measurement  error  problems,  we 
adopt  the  random  eﬀect  speciﬁcation  as  long  as  Hausman  test  cannot  reject  at  1%  level  the 
null  hypothesis  that  Xi  and  αh  are  uncorrelated. 
The  wage  function  is  thus  speciﬁed  as 
ˆ ln Wijt  =  Xitβj  +  ρjλijt  +  αhj  +  �ijt, j  = 1, 2,  (11) 
where  βj  is  a  vector  of  coeﬃcients  to  be  estimated,  which  represents  returns  to  human  capital 
for  an  activity j,  ρj  controls  for  the  selectivity bias,  and  �ijt  is  a  zero  mean  random  error  term. 
Household  speciﬁc  eﬀects  αhj  also  control  for  the  possibility  of  segmented  labor  markets. 
For  estimation,  two  sets  of  educational  achievement variables  are  available  (Section  2) 
—  schooling  years  and  a  series  of  dummy  variables  for  educational  stages.  When  Xi,edu  is  the 
number  of  schooling  years,  the  coeﬃcient  βj,edu  can  be  readily  interpreted  as  a  Mincerian  rate 
of  returns  to  schooling.  When  the  second  set  is  used,  coeﬃcient  estimates  can  be  converted 
into  a  Mincerian  rate  by  dividing  by  the  standard  years  of  schooling  for  each  stage. 
3.5  Productivity  in  Self­Employment  Activities 
Unlike  wage  work,  marginal  returns  to  labor  are  unobservable  for  self­employment  activities. 
What  can  be  readily  observed  is  gross  production  value,  value­added  (gross  production  value 
minus  costs  of  intermediate  input),  or  net  income  (value­added  minus  non­family  factor 
costs).  We  thus  estimate  production  functions  for  value­added,  as  was  adopted  by  Yang 
(1997).13 
Let  qhjt  denote  the  value­added  from  self­employment  activity  j  (=  3,  4)  for  household 
h  in  year  t.  A  Cobb­Douglas  production  function  is  assumed  with  two  primary  factors  of 
production  —  the  total  labor  input  by  household  h  into  activity  j,  denoted  as  Lhjt,  and  the 
total  capital  input  (non­agriculture)  or  the  total  land  input  (agriculture)  denoted  by  Hhjt. 
Each  household  is  used  as  a  unit  of  analysis  and  the  natural  log  of  value­added  is  used  as  a 
dependent variable. 
13Alternatively,  we  can  estimate  directly  the  system  of  Kuhn­Tucker  equations  that  equate  marginal  returns 
to  labor  with  marginal  rates  of  substitution  (Newman  and  Gertler,  1994).  Since  the  interests  of  this  paper 
are  on  the  eﬀects  of  education  on  returns  to  labor,  a  simpler  approach  of  production  functions  is  adopted, 
which  allows  an  intuitive  comparison  among  the  four  economic  activities  and  with  previous  studies. 
13 Three  econometric  issues  are  addressed  in  this  paper.  The  ﬁrst  is  sample  selection. 
Because  qhjt  is  observed  only  when  household  h  is  involved  in  j  = 3  or  4,  an  error  term  to 
the  value­added  equation  conditional  on  this  selection  has  non­zero  mean. To  control  for  this, 
Lee’s  (1983)  general  transformation  of  error  terms  to  normality  is  adopted,  as  in  the  case  of 
wage  functions.  Under  the  assumption  of  normality  of  the  error  terms  to  the  value­added 
λhjt  ≡ 
φ[Φ−1[ ˆ  ˆ functions,  the  correction  term  is  deﬁned  as ˆ Prob(zht =j)]] ,  where  Prob(zht  =  j)  is  ˆ Prob(zht =j) 
deﬁned  in  equation  (10). 
The  second  econometric  issue  is  a  potential  correlation  between  the  error  terms  to 
the  dependent  variables  on  the  one  hand  and  right­hand­side  variables  on  the  other  hand. 
The  correlation  could  occur  when  the  right­hand­side  variables  are  endogenous  to  household 
decisions  even  in  the  short  run.  Another  reason  for  the  potential  correlation  is  measurement 
errors.  These  two  problems  are  likely  to  be  serious  for  factor  inputs,  especially  labor  inputs. 
To  control  for  these  problems,  instruments  are  used  for  factor  inputs  and  some  other  right­
hand­side  variables. 
The  third  issue  is  unobserved  characteristics  that  aﬀect  the  productivity  of  enterprises. 
In  farm  production,  land  quality  might  diﬀer  from  farm  to  farm,  about  which  precise  infor­
mation  is  lacking  in  our  dataset.  In  both  farm  and  non­farm  enterprises,  households  could 
be  heterogeneous  with  respect  to  managerial  ability.  To  minimize  the  bias  from  omitting 
these  unobservable  variables,  a  household  speciﬁc  eﬀect,  αh,  is  added  to  the  value­added 
functions. 
Therefore,  the  empirical  model  for  self­employment  is  speciﬁed  as 
ˆ ln qhjt  =  bj0  +  bj1  ln Lhjt  +  bj2  ln Hhjt  +  Xhjtcj  +  ρjλhjt  +  αhj  +  �hjt, j  = 3,4,  (12) 
where  Xhjt  is  a  vector  of  household  h’s  characteristics  that  aﬀect  productivity  of  activity 
j,  such  as  household  human  capital  (education,  experience,  etc.)  and  production/market 
environment,  and  �hjt  is  an  i.i.d.  error  term.  Parameters  to  be  estimated  are  b0,  b1,  b2,  ρ, 
and  vector  c.  Because  many  households  have  zero  input  of  some  types  of  labor  diﬀerentiated 
by  education  and  gender,  these  labor  hours  cannot  be  incorporated  separately  in  a  Cobb­
Douglas  framework.  Therefore,  it  is  assumed  that  labor  inputs  are  perfectly  substitutable 
but  the  additive  weights  are  diﬀerent  by  the  types  of  labor,  reﬂecting  diﬀerent  productivity 
(Fafchamps  and  Quisumbing,  1999).  Parameter  vector  c  is  expected  to  capture  these  eﬀects. 
Theoretically,  there  are  several  routes  through  which  human  capital  may  aﬀect  produc­
tivity.  The  ﬁrst  route  is  its  eﬀects  on  the  eﬃciency  of  labor  inputs.  For  example,  a  literate 
14
laborer  will  be  able  to  follow  the  instruction  of  a  labor  task  more  precisely.  In  other  words, 
what  matters  to  production  is  not  the  amount  of  hours  of  labor  Lhjt  but  the  amount  adjusted 
for  its  quality.  Second,  the  accumulation  of  human  capital  might  improve  overall  technical 
eﬃciency  in  production.  Third,  the  accumulation  of  human  capital  might  improve  allocative 
eﬃciency  at  the  household  level.  For  example,  farms  with  higher  human  capital  might  be 
able  to  obtain  a  higher  proﬁt  by  allocating  production  factors  more  eﬃciently.  This  could 
occur  either  because  a  farm  manager  with  higher  human  capital  is  more  able  to  allocate 
resources  in  a  way  closer  to  what  maximizes  the  expected  proﬁt,  than  a  manager  with  lower 
human  capital,  or,  because a  farm  household  with  higher  human  capital  would  behave  in  a 
less  risk  averse  way  thanks  to  its  higher  ability  to  cope  with  risk,  even  when  both  types  of 
farms  are  equally  able  to  adopt  the  expected  proﬁt  maximizing  plan.  We  can  investigate 
whether  or  not  the  third  factor  is  important  by  estimating  agricultural  value­added  functions 
at  diﬀerent  aggregation  levels.  If  the  eﬀects  of  education  on  the  farm­level  value­added  are 
larger  than  those  on  value­added  of  individual  crops,  the  diﬀerence  could  be  attributable  to 
educated  farmers’  superiority  in  allocating  factors  across  crops. 
For  estimation,  several  sets  of  educational  variables  are  available.  Possible  choices 
include  the  maximum  or  minimum  of  education  among  all  household  members,  the  average 
(or  median)  of  all  household  members,  the  average  (or  median)  of  those  household  members 
who  work  in  the  household  self­employment  business,  the  education  level  of  the  household 
head,  and  so  on  (Jolliﬀe,  2002;  Yang,  1998).  Because  of  the  small  sample  size  and  high 
collinearity  among  these  variables,  simultaneous  inclusion  of  these  variables  did  not  work 
well.  Therefore,  each  of  these  choices  was  tried  in  the  initial  runs  and  the  one  that  resulted 
in  the  best  ﬁt  in  terms  of  adjusted  R2  is  reported  below. 
4  Estimation  Results 
4.1  Determinants  of  Labor  Allocation 
Table  4  reports  estimation  results  for  the  ﬁrst­stage multinomial  logit  model  (9).  Variables 
in  vector  Xit  (individual  characteristics  that  aﬀect  his/her  productivity  and  market  wage) 
include  age,  age  squared,  and  educational  achievement  dummies  (Model  A)  or  schooling  years 
(Model  B).  Age  and  age  squared  are  included  to  capture  non­linear  eﬀects  of  experiences. 
The  marginal  eﬀects  of  education  dummies  in  Model  A  suggest  a  pattern  with  accelerating 
probability  of  joining  non­farm  wage  markets  at  the  cost  of  farm  self­employment  as  the 
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education  level  goes  up.  This  is  conﬁrmed  by  negative  eﬀects  of  the  squared  term  of  male 
schooling  years  on  joining  non­farm  wage  markets  in  Model  B.  Thus  the  probability  of 
joining  non­farm  wage  markets  out  of  self­employment  farming  increases  with  education  at 
an  increasing  rate.  The  eﬀects  of  age  show  an  inverted  U  shape  for  farm  and  non­farm  wage 
employment  and  an  U  shape  for  farm  self­employment. 
The  marginal  eﬀects  of  Xht  show  that  households  with  more  adult  male  members  and 
less  dependent  members  are  more  likely  to  send  their  labor  force  to  outside  employment. 
Households  with  land  assets  are  more  likely  to  send  their  labor  force  to  their  own  farms. 
These  results  imply  that  the  necessity  of  family  labor  on  family  farms  is  an  important 
determinant  for  the  choice  whether  or  not  a  household  sends  household  members  to  non­
agricultural  wage  jobs. 
4.2  Eﬀects  of  Human  Capital  on  Non­Agricultural  Wages 
With  the  sample  selection  term  obtained  from  the  results  above,  the  second­stage  wage  equa­
tion  (11)  is  estimated  for  non­agricultural  wage  earners.14  The  dependent  variable  is  natural 
log  of  average  monthly  wage  from  non­agricultural  employment.  In  estimation,  an  intercept 
dummy  for  the  second  survey  is  added  to  control  for  macro  shocks.  Estimation  results  are 
shown  in  Table  5,  based  on  a  random  eﬀect  speciﬁcation.  Although  χ2  statistics  for  Hausman 
test  is  somewhat  large,  it  is  not  larger  than  the  1%  signiﬁcance  level.  Therefore,  random 
eﬀect  estimation  results  are  reported,  which  are  likely  to  be  more  robust  to  measurement 
errors  than  ﬁxed  eﬀect  results.15 
Estimation  results  show  that  there  are  signiﬁcantly  positive  eﬀects  of  education  on  the 
wage  level.  A  worker  with  primary  education  is  expected  to  be  paid  17%  (≈ e0.154 − 1)  higher 
than  a  non­literate  worker  (reference  group);  with  middle  school  education,  31%  higher;  and 
14Xht  in  (9)  serve  as  identifying  variables  for  the  selection  term.  We  assume  that  household  asset  variables 
that  are  closely  related  with  farming  such  as  land  holding  do  not  directly  aﬀect  wages  paid  by  others  for  non­
agricultural  works  but  only  indirectly  through  activity  choices.  Although  it  is  possible  that  these  variables 
may  capture  unobservable  ability  of  individuals  in  implementing  non­agricultural  work  so  that  they  aﬀect 
non­agricultural wages  directly,  our  ﬁeld  observations  suggest  that  this  is  unlikely.  For  example,  the  nutrition­
based  eﬃciency  wage  theory  suggests  that  individuals  from  landed  family  are  paid  higher  due  to  their  superior 
nutrition  conditions.  This  is  unlikely  among  villagers  in  the  study  areas,  since  little  diﬀerence  was  observed 
in  calorie  intake  across  land  holding  classes. 
15The  returns  to  schooling  reported  in  this  paper  could  be  an  overestimate  for  rates  of  return  expected 
from  education  investment  on  a  random  basis,  if  more  able  children  are  selected  by  the  parents  or  by  the 
community  to  receive  higher  education  (innate  ability  bias).  The  bias  may  not  be  large  since  we  utilize  panel 
information  to  control  for  household­level  unobservables  by  αh.  Furthermore,  the  consensus  in  the  literature 
is  that  the  upward  ability  bias  may  exist  but  is  relatively  small  (Card,  1999),  which  is  applicable  to  the  case 
of  Pakistan  as  well  (Alderman  et  al.,  1996;  2001). 
16 with  high  and  higher  school  education,  64%  higher  (Model  A).  These  parameters  imply  the 
following  Mincerian  rates  of  returns:  3.1%  for  education  up  to  the  primary  level,  3.4%  for 
education  up  to  the  middle  level,  and  4.4%  for  education  up  to  the  secondary  and  higher 
level;  or  3.9%  for  additional  middle  education  after  primary  education  and  5.8%  for  additional 
higher  education  after  middle  education.  This  range  is  consistent  with  the  estimates  in  earlier 
studies  on  the  returns  to  schooling  in  rural  non­farm  activities  in  Pakistan  (Fafchamps  and 
Quisumbing,  1999;  Alderman  et  al.,  1996).  When  the  schooling  year  and  its  quadratic  term 
are  included  as  education  variables  (Model  B),  only  the  positive  coeﬃcient  on  the  quadratic 
term  is  statistically  signiﬁcant.  These  results  suggest  a  possibility  that  return  to  education 
increases  with  education  at  an  increasing  rate,  which  is  consistent  with  results  for  labor 
market  participation  (Table  4). 
Since  non­farm  wage  employment  is  diverse,  distinguishing  various  types  with  more 
disaggregation,  e.g.,  by  industries  or  by  the  size  of  establishments,  could  be  important.  Our 
samples  do  not  have  suﬃcient  variation  in  the  establishment  size.  Preliminary  examination 
showed  that  wages  were  not  diﬀerent  across  industries  but  substantially  diﬀerent  whether 
a  person  is  hired  casually  or  regularly.  Therefore,  we  extended  the  model  in  (9)  by  distin­
guishing  these  two  types  of  non­agricultral  wage  employment  and  re­estimated  the  Mincerian 
model  in  (11)  separately  for  the  two  types.  Since  the  diﬀerence  of  the  coeﬃcients  was  not 
statistically  signiﬁcant  except  for  the  intercept,  we  merged  them  with  an  employment  type 
dummy.  Estimation  results  are  reported  as  Model  C  in  Table  5.  In  eﬀect,  the  coeﬃcient 
on  the  dummy  in  Model  C  shows  the  treatment  eﬀect  of  working  in  regularly­hired  activity 
with  the  endogenous  selection  controlled  for.  The  dummy  variable  is  signiﬁcantly  positive, 
indicating  that  wages  for  the  regularly  hired  were  on  average  60%  (≈ e0.474  − 1)  higher  than 
those  for  the  casually  hired.16  The  coeﬃcients  on  education  in  Model  C  are  much  smaller 
than  those  in  Model  A.  This  is  because  more  educated  individuals  are  more  likely  to  work 
regularly.  Education  thus  not  only  increases  the  wage  in  non­agriculture  but  also  increases 
the  probability  of  working  in  non­agricultural  activities  with  higher  and  stable  payment. 
Among  other  human  capital  variables  in  vector  Xi,  age  as  a  proxy  for  job  experience 
shows  an  inverted  U­shape,  with  both  coeﬃcients  on  linear  and  quadratic  terms  signiﬁcant. 
Wage  is  maximized  at  the  age  range  of  42  to  47  years,  depending  on  the  model.  These 
Some  of  this  diﬀerence  might  be  due  to  the  diﬀerence  in  the  intensity  of  employment  in  a  month,  although 
we  corrected  for  the  diﬀerence  in  working  days  by  using  daily  earnings  multiplied  by  the  standard  number  of 
monthly  working  days  for  the  casually­hired,  not  the  observed  monthly  earnings. 
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16results  suggest  that  productivity  in  non­agricultural  wage  work  responds  positively  with 
experience  but  at  a  diminishing  rate.  The  selection  term  is  signiﬁcantly  positive  in  all  the 
models,  indicating  a  positive  selection.  Individuals  whose  propensity  to  be  employed  in  non­
agrucluture  is  high  are  expected  to  earn  more  even  after  controlling  for  the  direct  eﬀects  of 
their  individual  attributes  on  wages. 
4.3  Eﬀects  of  Human  Capital  on  Agricultural  Wages 
Table  6  reports  estimation  results  for  agricultural wage  earners.  The  dependent variable  is 
natural  log  of  average  monthly  wages  from  agricultural  employment. 
In  sharp  contrast  to  results  in  Table  5,  only  the  coeﬃcient  on  primary  education  dummy 
is  signiﬁcant  with  about  3.8%  Mincerian  returns  (Mode  A).  Education  higher  than  the  pri­
mary  level  does  not  seem  to  contribute  to  higher  agricultural  wages.  When  both  linear 
and  quadratic  terms  of  schooling  years  are  included  (Model  B),  both  are  signiﬁcant  with 
inverted  U  shape,  implying  that  marginal  returns  to  education  becomes  negative  at  more 
than  ﬁve  years  of  schooling  (i.e.,  standard  years  of  primary  schooling  in  Pakistan).  Age 
and  age  squared  show  an  inverted  U­shape  but  the  coeﬃcients  are  smaller  than  those  for 
non­agricultural wages. 
The  non­response  of  farm  wages  to  higher  education  is  understandable  considering  the 
nature  of  the  farm  labor  market  in  the  study  region.  Most  of  these  workers  are  hired  for 
unskilled,  manual  work  on  the  farm  such  as  weeding,  harvesting,  transporting,  etc.  It  is 
no  wonder  that  job  experiences  or  education  do  not  contribute  much  to  improvement  in 
productivity  of  such  works.  The  selection  term  is  positive  but  not  statistically  signiﬁcant. 
4.4  Eﬀects  of  Human  Capital  on  Non­Farm  Enterprise  Productivity 
Production  function  (12)  is  estimated  for  non­agricultural  self­employment.  The  dependent 
variable  is  natural  log  of  value­added  from  non­farm  enterprises.  Labor  input  is  measured 
by  the  monetary  sum  of  wages  actually  paid  to  hired  workers  and  imputed  wages  for  family 
workers  using  the  same  wages  or  village  average  wages  imputed  at  daily  basis.  Capital  input 
is  deﬁned  as  the  total  capital  used  in  production,  approximated  by  the  machinery/equipment 
depreciation  and  land  rents  for  the  non­farm  enterprise.  Since  the  two  factors  of  production, 
labor  and  capital,  are  determined  endogenously  by  the  household  and  they  are  also  likely  to 
suﬀer  from  measurement  errors,  they  are  replaced  by  their  ﬁtted  values  using  other  right­
hand­side  variables,  the  acreage  of  agricultural  land  owned  by  the  household,  the  number 
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of  adult  males,  the  net  value  of  household  assets  (transportation  and  durable  consumption 
goods),  and  the  value  of  livestock  (both  levels  and  logs)  as  instruments. 
Two  stage  least  squares  random  eﬀect  estimation  results  are  reported  in  Table  7.  The 
coeﬃcients  on  both  of  the  production  factors  are  statistically  signiﬁcant.  Elasticities  of  pro­
duction  with  respect  to  the  two  production  factors  are  estimated  in  a  reasonable  range,  with 
their  sum  around  0.83,  indicating  slightly  decreasing  returns  to  scale  in  non­farm  enterprises 
in  the  study  area. 
Regarding  the  eﬀects  of  education  variables,  the  average  education  among  those  house­
hold  members  who  are  engaged  in  the  non­farm  business  performed  marginally  better  than 
other  speciﬁcations  in  terms  of  adjusted  R2.  This  could  be  due  to  the  fact  that  the  number 
of  those  engaged  in  non­farm  business  within  a  household  is  not  large  and  they  do  not  always 
include  the  household  head  and  the  individual  with  the  highest  education.  The  coeﬃcients  on 
educational  stage  dummies  show  signiﬁcantly  positive  eﬀects  with  higher  reward  for  higher 
education  (Model  A).  This  is  similar  to  the  results  for  non­farm  wages  but  the  diﬀerence 
among  educational  stages  is  larger.  When  educational  achievement  dummies  are  replaced 
by  schooling  years,  their  coeﬃcients  are  insigniﬁcant  when  both  linear  and  quadratic  terms 
are  included  but  a  model  with  a  quadratic  term  only  has  a  signiﬁcantly  positive  coeﬃcient 
and  ﬁts  the  data  marginally  better  than  a  model  with  a  linear  term  only  (not  reported). 
Coeﬃcients  on  the  age  of  the  household  head  and  its  quadratic  term  show  an  U­shape,  but 
only  the  quadratic  term  is  signiﬁcant  in  both  models.  This  seems  to  suggest  that  experience 
is  associated  with  an  increasing  return  in  managing  non­farm  enterprises.  The  coeﬃcient 
on  the  sample  selection  term  is  close  to  zero  and  not  statistically  signiﬁcant,  suggesting 
that  errors  in  labor  allocation  decisions  and  those  in  value­added  functions  are  not  strongly 
correlated. 
Since  non­farm  enterprises  are  diverse,  distinguishing  various  types  of  non­farm  activ­
ities  with  more  disaggregation,  e.g.,  low­end  type  jobs  like  hawkers  and  high­end  type  jobs 
like  wheat  mill  owners,  could  be  important  (Lanjouw,  1999;  Lanjouw  and  Lanjouw,  2001). 
Considering  the  limited  number  of  observations,  a  dummy  variable  for  those  self­employed 
activities  that  are  carried  out  in  a  permanent  business  space  (for  example,  shop  space  or 
workshop  space)  is  included  in  Model  B.  Since  the  dummy  variable  could  be  endogenous, 
the  selection  term  was  re­estimated  by  extending  the  model  in  (9)  by distinguishing  these  two 
types  of  non­agricultral  self­employment.  The  dummy  variable  has  a  signiﬁcantly  positive 
coeﬃcient,  indicating  that  those  enterprises  with  business  spaces  are  likely  to  belong  to  the 
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high­end  type  jobs.  The  coeﬃcients  on  education  in  Model  B  are  much  smaller  than  those  in 
Model  A.  This  implies  that  the  education  level  of  those  household  members  working  in  non­
farm  enterprises  and  the  type  of  business  (low­end  vs.  high­end)  are  positively  correlated. 
Therefore,  education  is  associated  not  only  with  higher  productivity  in  non­agricultural  self­
employment  but  also  with  higher  probability  of  having  high­end  type  enterprises. 
4.5  Eﬀects  of  Human  Capital  on  Farm  Productivity 
Finally,  production  function  (12)  is  estimated  for  agricultural  value­added  either  from  wheat 
or  from  all  crops  combined.  The  ﬁrst  factor  of  production,  labor,  is  calculated  in  a  way 
similar  to  that  of  non­farm  enterprises.  The  second  factor  of  production  is  now  a  land  input, 
measured  by  the  wheat­cropp ed  area  or  the  total  farm  area.  Wheat  is  the  staple  food  in  the 
region,  grown  with  homogeneous  production  technology,  except  for  the  extent  of  irrigation. 
It  is  the  crop  cultivated  by  the  majority  of  farmers. 
The  vector  Xhjt  in  equation  (12)  includes  those  household  characteristics  that  aﬀect 
farm  productivity,  such  as  household  human  capital  and  production/market  environment. 
Regarding  the  latter,  the  most  important  factor  is  irrigation.  Therefore,  irrigation  ratio 
on  the  farm  is  included.  In  addition,  the  share  of  land  under  sharecropping  arrangements, 
village  dummies,  and  cross  terms  between  them  are  tried.  Sharecropping  ratios  are  included 
to  control  for  the  productivity  impacts  of  agrarian  contracts  (Hayami  and  Otsuka,  1993). 
Table  8  gives  2SLS  random  eﬀect  estimation  results  for  wheat  value­added.  In  the 
2SLS  estimation,  the  two  production  factors  and  the  sharecropping  ratio  are  replaced  by 
their  ﬁtted  values.  Identifying  instrumental  variables  are  the  same  as  those  used  for  non­
farm  enterprises. 
The  coeﬃcients  on  both  of  the  production  factors  are  statistically  signiﬁcant  but  that 
on  labor  is  much  smaller  than  the  case  of  non­farm  business,  indicating  the  paramount 
importance  of  land  in  farming.  As  expected,  the  eﬀect  of  irrigation  is  signiﬁcantly  positive. 
Labor  productivity  in  wheat  production  in  a  completely  irrigated  farm  is  close  to  three 
times  the  productivity  in  a  completely  rainfed  farm  (e1.076  ≈  2.93).  Unexpectedly,  the 
sharecropping  ratio  in  wheat  cropped  land  has  a  positive  eﬀect.  It  is  signiﬁcant  only  in 
Village  A,  after  deleting  insigniﬁcant  cross  terms  with  village  dummies.  This  seems  to  suggest 
that  sharecropping  contracts  are  associated  with  superior  access  to  capital  for  tenant  farmers 
through  landlords  in  Village  A,  where  ﬁnancial  institutions  are  the  least  developed  (Kurosaki 
and  Hussain,  1999).  Another  possibility  is  that  due  to  low  and  unstable  land  productivity 
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in  Village  A,  only  those  plots  that  are  inherently  more  productive  are  rented  out  but  the 
quality  diﬀerence  in  land  is  unobservable  to  us  and  may  not  be  controlled  completely  with 
household  speciﬁc  eﬀects  αh.  In  any  case,  the  reason  for  the  absence  of  disincentive  eﬀects 
of  sharecropping  on  productivity  could  be  attributable  to  low  monitoring  costs  in  the  study 
region  with  close  relationships  between  tenants  and  landlords  (Kurosaki  and  Hussain,  1999). 
The  coeﬃcient  on  the  sample  selection  term  is  not  statistically  signiﬁcant. 
Regarding  the  household  education  variables,  the  average  education  among  those  house­
17 hold  members  who  are  engaged  in  farming  performed  the  best  in  terms  of  adjusted  R2 . 
In  sharp  contrast  to  results  for  non­farm  enterprises,  none  of  the  coeﬃcients  on  primary, 
middle,  and  high  education  are  signiﬁcant  (Model  A).  Replacing  these  education  variables 
by  schooling  years  do  not  yield  meaningful  results  (not  reported).  When  the  three  education 
levels  are  merged  into  one  variable  of  “literacy”  dummy,  its  coeﬃcient  is  still  insigniﬁcant 
(Model  B).  Therefore,  returns  to  schooling  in  wheat  production  are  not  discernible  from  our 
data. 
Table  9  gives  estimation  results  of  the  same  model  when  it  is  applied  to  value­added 
from  all  the  crops.  The  eﬀects  of  irrigation  and  the  cross  term  of  sharecropping  ratio  and  Vil­
lage  A  dummy  are  stronger,  suggesting  that  crops  competing  with  wheat  are  more  irrigation 
sensitive  and  capital  intensive  than  wheat.  Now  two  of  the  education  dummies  have  signiﬁ­
cant  coeﬃcients  with  similar  magnitudes  (Model  A).  The  null  hypothesis  that  the  coeﬃcients 
on  the  three  dummies  are  the  same  was  not  rejected  at  10%  level.  Therefore,  acceleration 
of  returns  to  education  is  not  observed  in  agricultural  self­employment.  Having  additional 
years  of  education  beyond  the  primary  or  middle  levels  does  not  seem  to  contribute  to  higher 
farm  productivity  in  the  study  area.  When  the  three  stages  are  merged,  the  impact  of  the 
average  literacy  of  family  farm  labor  is  statistically  signiﬁcant  at  1%  and  its  magnitude  is 
much  higher  than  the  case  for  wheat  (Model  B). 
17The  highest  education  levels  among  household  members  are  not  statistically  signiﬁcant  in  most  of  the 
cases  (Kurosaki,  2001).  Our  ﬁnding  is  consistent  with  Jolliﬀe’s  (2002)  ﬁnding  that,  among  several  alternative 
measures  of  household  education,  the  average  among  the  household  members  is  the  best  determinant  of 
household  productivity  in  Ghana.  On  the  other  hand,  ours  is  in  sharp  contrast  to  Yang’s  (1997,  1998) 
ﬁnding  for  Chinese  farmers  that  the  household  maximum  education  matters  the  most  in  determining  farm 
productivity.  Yang  (1997)  argued  that  the  more  educated  members  of  a  Chinese  farm  household,  even  when 
they  have  non­farm  jobs,  can  contribute  to  decision  making  on  the  farms,  through  which  their  education 
raises  farm  productivity.  In  our  case,  the  more  educated  members  of  the  household  with  non­agricultural 
jobs  are  usually  indiﬀerent  to  farm  management.  This  could be  due  to  three  factors  in  the  study  region: 
(1)  a  strong  preference  for  non­manual  (i.e.,  non­agricultural)  work,  (2)  a  larger  household  size  that  enables 
educated  family  members  to  be  specialized  in  non­farm  activities,  and  (3)  a  relatively  low  share  of  agricultural 
income  in  the  total  household  income. 
21 When  value­added  functions  were  estimated  for  individual  non­wheat  crops,  we  were 
not  able  to  obtain  signiﬁcant  eﬀects  of  education,  possibly  due  to  the  small  size  of  samples. 
When  value­added  functions  were  estimated  for  non­wheat  crops  combined,  coeﬃcients  on 
education  were  similar  to  or  smaller  than  those  shown  in  Table  9.  Our  ﬁeld  observations  also 
suggest  that  gains  in  eﬃciency  units  of  labor  or  in  technical  eﬃciency  due  to  education  in 
each  cultivation  cycle  are  small,  if  any,  and  show  little  diﬀerence  across  crops.  Therefore,  we 
interpret  that  the  larger  coeﬃcients  on  education  at  the  farm  level  suggests  that  educated 
farmers  are  more  able  to  allocate  land  eﬃciently  among  diﬀerent  crops.18 
In  sharp  contrast  to  non­farm  enterprises,  the  additional  gain  from  education  higher 
than  the  primary  level  is  not  large  in  farming.  This  is  consistent  with  our  ﬁndings  for 
agricultural  wages  in  Table  6.  However,  this  contradicts  the  ﬁndings  in  the  existing  literature 
on  technical  eﬃciency  in  Pakistan’s  agriculture  (Hussain,  1989;  Ahmad  et  al.,  2002),  which 
argued  that  most  of  the  progressive  farmers  adopting  superior  technology  have  education 
higher  than  the  primary  or  middle  levels.  We  interpret  our  results  as  showing  that  the 
main  contribution  of  education  to  farm  value­added  comes  from  a  more  eﬃcient  crop  choice. 
In  order  to  be  sensitive  to  market  returns,  a  jump  from  no  education  to  formal,  primary 
education  may  matter  more  than  a  marginal  gain  from  schooling  above  the  primary  or 
middle  levels.  In  other  words,  farmers  who  have  primary  or  higher  education  can  behave  in 
a  more  market­oriented  way  than  those  who  have  never  attended  schools. 
The  results,  therefore,  shed  new  light  on  the  controversy  on  the  eﬀects  of  education  on 
farm  productivity  (Lockheed  et  al.,  1980;  Jamison  and  Lau,  1982;  Yang,  1998).  First,  its 
eﬀects  are  likely  to  be  non­linear.  Our  results  suggest  a  possibility  that  in  farm  production, 
a  jump  from  no  education  to  literacy  matters  the  most.  If  this  is  the  case,  applying  a 
model  that  includes  only  a  linear  term  of  schooling  years  may  result  in  the  insigniﬁcance 
of  education.  Second,  its  eﬀects  are  likely  to  diﬀer  at  diﬀerent  levels  of  aggregating  farm 
output.  Our  results  suggest  that  at  a  higher  level  of  aggregation,  the  eﬀects  of  education  can 
be  depicted  more  distinctly,  possibly  due  to  the  superiority  of  educated  farmers  in  allocating 
factors  eﬃciently. 
See  also  results  by  Yang  and  An  (2002),  who  found  that  schooling  improved  the  eﬃciency  in  allocating 
quasi­ﬁxed  inputs  across  sectors  within  a  farm  household  in  China. 
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184.6  Job  Stratiﬁcation  and  Returns  to  Labor 
An  important  ﬁnding  from  the  previous  subsections  is  the  contrast  between  the  response  to 
higher  education  of  farm  returns  and  that  of  non­farm  productivity  —  the  farm  returns  are 
the  most  sensitive  to  the  literacy  whereas  the  non­farm  labor  markets  remunerate  higher 
education  with  a  higher  wage.19  Because  of  this  reason  and  the  diminishing  return  to  labor 
in  self­employment  on  the  farm,  which  is  captured  by  a  coeﬃcient  on  the  labor  input  signiﬁ­
cantly  smaller  than  unity  in  Tables  8­9,  we  expect  that  more  educated  households  have  more 
diversiﬁed  labor  force,  spanning  a  number  of  non­farm  activities.  Then  how  much  can  these 
diﬀerences  in  labor  returns  alone  explain  the  observed  allocation  of  labor  force?  To  examine 
this  question,  this  subsection  simulates  labor  force  allocation  predicted  by  estimation  results 
in  Tables  5­9  but  ignoring  selection  terms,  instead  of  simulating  labor  force  allocation  based 
on  the  multinomial  logit  results. 
In  the  simulation,  we  would  like  to  allocate  individual  i  in  household  h  to  sector  j 
where  his  marginal  labor  return  is  the  highest.  As  in  Subsection  3.1,  let  fhj(Lij) be  his 
net­return­to­lab or  function.  For  wage  sectors,  we  assume  that  ln(∂fhjt/∂Lijt)  = ln Wijt. 
Therefore,  we  calculate  a  ﬁtted  value  or  out­of­sample  forecast  value  from  estimation  results 
of  equation  (11)  for  the  simulation,  namely, 
ˆ ln(∂fhjt/∂Lijt) ≡ Xitβ ˆj, j  = 1,2.  (13) 
For  self­employment,  what  we  have  estimated  is  ln qhjt,  the  value­added  from  household 
h’s  activity  j.  Based  on  the  approximation  ∂fhjt/∂Lijt  ≈ ∂qhjt/∂Lhjt  =  bj1qhjt/Lhjt,  where 
bj1  is  a  coeﬃcient  on  the  log  of  labor  in  equation  (12),  we  calculate 
ˆ ln(∂fhjt/∂Lijt) ≡ lnˆ bj1+ˆ bj0+(ˆ bj1−1) ln Lhjt+ˆ bj2  ln Hhjt+Xhjtc ˆj, j = 3,4,  ∀i  ∈ h.  (14) 
19To  examine  the  robustness  of  these  results  based  on  the  selection  correction  formula  by  Lee  (1983), 
diﬀerent  speciﬁcations were  also  attempted. For  individual­level  wage  equations,  the  selection  term  suggested 
by  Dubin  and  McFadden  (1984),  which  does  not  require  the  assumption  of  normality  of  the  error  term  to  the 
wage  equation,  was  also  available.  For  household­level  value­added  equations,  we  estimated  a  household­level 
probit  model  in  which  the  probability  of  having  a  (non­)farm  enterprise  is  regressed  on  Xh  and  household­
level  averages  of  Xi  used  in  model  (9).  An  inverse  Mills  ratio  estimated  from  this  probit  model  replaced 
ˆ λhjt  in  equation  (12).  The  results  based  on  these  alternative  speciﬁcations  (available  on  request)  were  very 
close  to  those  reported  in  Tables  5­9  in  this  paper.  Farm  production  functions  under  diﬀerent  speciﬁcations 
yielded  qualitatively  the  same  results.  For  example,  cross  terms  of  education  dummies  and  village  dummies 
were  also  tried  to  investigate  whether  returns  to  higher  education  in  farming  are  higher  only  in  modernizing 
environments  (Schultz,  1961),  such  as  Village  C  in  our  data  set.  These  cross  terms  were  not  signiﬁcant.  To 
investigate  whether  or  not  attrition  seriously  bias  the  estimation  results  reported  in  this  paper,  an  inverse 
Mills  ratio  estimated  from  the  probit  model  given  in  Appendix  2  was  added  to  the  household­level,  value­
added  models  in  this  paper  using  the  sub­sample  of  households  belonging  to  the  balanced  panel.  It  was  found 
that  the  magnitudes  and  signiﬁcance  of  coeﬃcients  did  not  change,  and  the  coeﬃcient  on  the  inverse  Mills 
ratio  was  not  signiﬁcant  either,  suggesting  that  the  attrition  bias  may  not  be  serious. 
23 This  value  is  calculated  only  for  those  individuals  belonging  to  a  household,  where  Lhjt, 
Hhjt,  and  Xhjt  are  available,  i.e.,  a  household  with  self­employment  activities. 
We  thereby  obtain  ˆ ln(∂fjt/∂Lijt),  for  each  individual  i  in  year  t,  where  j  = 1  (non­
agricultural  wage),  2  (agricultural  wage),  3  (self­employment  in  non­agriculture),  and  4  (self­
employment  in  agriculture).20  Then  each  individual  is  assigned  a  “predicted”  job  whose 
ˆ ln(∂fjt/∂Lijt)  is  the  highest  among  the  four  activities  (or  three  or  two,  depending  on  the 
household).  This  exercise  corresponds  to  the  theoretical  model  of  labor  allocation  given  in 
Subsection  3.1.  In  other  words,  factors  other  than  marginal  labor  productivity,  such  as  risk 
aversion  (Subsection  3.2),  are  assumed  away. 
Predicted  patterns  of  labor  allocation  are  summarized  in  Table  10.  Diagonal  cells 
show  the  number  of  correctly  predicted  individuals.  Oﬀ­diagonal  numbers  correspond  to 
those  individuals  with  wrong  prediction.  Among  1,612  males  engaged  in  one  of  the  four 
sectors  as  a  primary  job,  896  or  55.6%  are  predicted  correctly,  which  is  a  reasonably  high 
percentage  as  a  whole,  considering  that  a  substantial  part  of  the  information  included  in 
household  attributes  Xth  used  in  estimating  the  multinomial  logit  model  (9)  is  ignored.  The 
multinomial  logit  results  in  Table  4  predict  labor  allocation  correctly  for  990  or  61.4%  of 
the  same  individuals.  The  relatively­good  performance  of  the  simulation  in  Table  10  implies 
that  diﬀerence  in  individuals’  productivity  due  to  diﬀerent  education  levels  underlies  the  job 
stratiﬁcation  with  a  substantial  income  disparity. 
What  will  happen  to  the  static  picture  of  job  stratiﬁcation  in  the  long  run?  If  the 
schooling  decision  by  the  sample  households  is  solely  based  on  an  investment  criterion  and 
the  credit  and  insurance  markets  are  perfect,  children’s  schooling  should  be  independent  of 
households’  wealth.  Only  when  innate  ability  is  transferred  from  parents  to  children,  we 
expect  positive  correlation  between  parents’  education  and  children’s  education.  However, 
credit  and  insurance  markets  in  the  study  region  are  very  incomplete  (Kurosaki,  forthcom­
ing;  Kurosaki  and  Khan,  2001).  In  the  study  villages,  very  few  villagers  use  formal  ﬁnancial 
institutions,  informal  moneylenders  are  not  available,  and  a  tradition  to  borrow  money  with 
explicit  interest  rates  in  order  to  run  a  small  scale  business  is  missing.  Reciprocal  lend­
ing/borrowing  is  common  but  its  ability  to  fund  large  investment  is  very  limited.  As  a  result 
of  these  credit  constraints,  parents’  education  and  physical  assets  are  positively  correlated 
In  simulation,  parameter  estimates  from  Model  A  in  Tables  5­7  and  9  using  educational  stage  dummies 
were  used.  For  non­farm  wages  and  non­farm  enterprises,  the  speciﬁcation  without  employment/business 
type  was  used  because  we  are  interested  in  capturing  the  full  eﬀect  of  education.  Simulation  results  were 
qualitatively  the  same  when  models  using  schooling  years  were  chosen. 
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20with  children’s  enrollment  into  schools.21  Thus,  the  stratiﬁcation  is  likely  to  be  re­produced 
over  generations  under  the  market  conditions  prevailing  in  the  study  region. 
Predictions  regarding  agricultural  wage  jobs  are  less  precise  though.  This  could  be 
attributable  to  a  social  stigma  associated  with  agricultural wage  employment  as  a  primary 
job.  In  the  study  region,  full  time  farm  laborers  are  found  only  among  those  households 
belonging  to  the  lowest  social  rank.  Incorrect  prediction  for  several  individuals  in  Table  10 
could  also  be  attributable  to  household  risk  aversion.  Agriculture  is  risky,  especially  crop 
farming  in  Village  A,  which  is  not  irrigated  (Kurosaki,  forthcoming;  Kurosaki  and  Hussain, 
1999). 
5  Conclusions 
This  paper  investigated  the  eﬀects  of  human  capital  on  farm  and  non­farm  productivity using 
micro  panel  data  of  rural  households  in  NWFP,  Pakistan,  where  a  substantial  job  stratiﬁ­
cation  is  observed  in  terms  of  income  and  education. To  clarify  the  mechanism  underlying 
this  stratiﬁcation,  the  human  capital  eﬀects  are  estimated  both  for  wages  (individual  level) 
and  for  self­employed  activities  (household  level)  on  the  one  hand  and  both  for  farm  and 
non­farm  sectors  on  the  other  hand. 
Estimation  results  of  returns­to­lab or  regression  models  can  be  summarized  as  follows. 
First,  private  returns  to  education  are  signiﬁcantly  positive  in  non­farm  wages  for  males, 
which  increase  with  education  at  an  increasing  rate.  Second,  the  eﬀects  of  human  capital 
are  weak  on  agricultural  wages.  Third,  the  eﬀects  of  education  on  non­farm  enterprise 
productivity are  positive  with  acceleration  in  reward  as  in  the  case  for  non­agricultural  wages. 
Fourth,  the  eﬀects  of  primary  education  on  crop  productivity  are  positive  but  the  additional 
gain  from  higher  education  is  small.  Fifth,  the  eﬀects  of  education  on  crop  productivity  are 
more  signiﬁcant  at  more  aggregate  levels  in  farm  production,  possibly  reﬂecting  the  eﬃciency 
in  factor  allocation  by  educated  farmers.  The  non­linearity  and  aggregation  issues  regarding 
the  eﬀects  of  education  could  be  one  of  the  reasons  for  the  mixed  results  in  the  existing 
literature  on  the  eﬀects  of  education  on  farm  productivity  in  developing  countries. 
These  results  thus  show  a  clear  contrast  between  farm  and  non­farm  sectors  —  wages 
and  productivity  in  non­farm  activities  rise  with  education  at  an  increasing  rate,  whereas 
21Preliminary  results  of  regressing  enrollment  on  household  attributes  revealed  that  an  increase  of  owned 
land  by  the  mean  size  increases  the  primary  enrollment  ratio  at  the  household  level  by  21%  (statistically 
signiﬁcant  at  5%)  and  an  increase  of  household  head’s  education  by  a  year  increases  the  enrollment  ratio  by 
2%  (statistically  signiﬁcant  at  1%).  These  results  are  available  on  request. 
25 those  in  agriculture  respond  only  to  the  primary  education.  They  imply  that  more  educated 
household  members  have  comparative  advantages  in  non­farming,  which  was  conﬁrmed  by 
comparing  observed  labor  force  allocation  with  simulated  labor  force  allocation  predicted  by 
the  diﬀerence  in  labor  returns.  In  other  words,  the  diﬀerence  in  individuals’  comparative 
advantages  due  to  diﬀerent  education  levels  underlies  the  job  stratiﬁcation,  which  is  likely 
to  be  re­produced  over  generations  under  imperfect  credit  markets  in  the  study  region. 
The  ﬁndings  of  this  paper  could  justify  a  policy  to  give  high  priority  to  primary  edu­
cation  in  rural  Pakistan,  because  the  provision  of  quality  primary  education  has  eﬃciency 
enhancing  eﬀects  on  various  rural  activities.  Since  the  private  returns  to  higher  education 
are  suﬃciently  high  for  males  in  non­farm  sectors,  the  priority  of  public  intervention  into 
those  levels  might  be  lower  than  the  case  for  primary  education. 
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Table  1:  Sample  Villages  and  Sample  Households  (NWFP,  Pakistan) 
Village  A  Village  B  Village  C 
Characteristics  of  the  Sample  Villages 
Irrigation  Rainfed  Rainfed/  Irrigated 
Irrigated 
Distance  to  main  roads  10km  4km  1km 
Population  (1998  Census)  2,858  3,831  7,575 
Number  of  households  (1998  Census)  293  420  1,004 
Adult  literacy  rates  (%,  1998  Census)  25.8  19.9  37.5 
Number  of  the  Sample  Households  (1996) 
Total  119  116  120 
Non­farm  households  38  40  41 
Farm  households,  total  81  76  79 
Owner  farm  households  48  38  39 
Owner­cum­tenant  farm  households  17  18  16 
Pure  tenant  farm  households  16  20  24 
Number  of  the  Sample  Households  (1999) 
Total  117  115  120 
Replacement  sample  households  26  4  13 
Resurveyed  households  91  111  107 
Complete  and  comparable  panel  hhs.  83  111  105 
Divided  households  8  0  0 
Households  with  incomplete  information  0  0  2 
Characteristics  of  the  complete  and  comparable  panel  households 
Average  household  size  in  1996  10.7  8.4  9.0 
Average  household  size  in  1999  11.1  7.9  9.3 
Average  landholding  size  in  1996  (ha)  2.23  0.52  0.58 
Average  landholding  size  in  1999  (ha)  2.26  0.52  0.60 
Average  per­capita  income,  1996  ($)  194  231  337 
Average  per­capita  income,  1999  ($)  148  165  212 
Average  per­capita  consumption,  1996  ($)  134  157  201 
Average  per­capita  consumption,  1999  ($)  133  143  198 
Notes:  (1)  “Average  landholding  size  is  the  average  over  the  total  of  complete  panel  including  landless 
households. 
(2)  “Average  per­capita  income  (consumption)”  is  the  average  over  individuals  included  in  the  com­
plete  panel  and  its  unit  is  US  $  in  nominal  values. 
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Table  2:  Labor  Force  Allocation  and  Household  Income 
A.  Distribution  of  Working  Household  Members  by  Employment  Status  and  Sector 
Household  Employee  Self­Employed 
work  Non­ag.  Agri.  Non­ag.  Agri. 
1996  Survey 
Males  13  383  58  78  284 
Females  762  6 0  3 4 
1999  Survey 
Males  10  459  25  125  200 
Females  774  9 0  1 3 
B.  Level  and  Composition  of  Household  Income  Excluding  Transfers  and  Remittances 
Mean  level  of  Composition  Share  (%) 
household 
income  # 
Employee 





1996  Survey 
All  sample  households  70,468  41.41  6.01  25.01  27.57 
Non­farm  households  58,839  49.33  9.37  33.83  7.48 
Owner  farm  households  81,986  35.36  2.38  22.33  39.93 
Owner­cum­tenant  farm  hh.  75,346  38.44  4.12  23.09  34.35 
Pure  tenant  farm  hh.  65,389  45.98  11.37  18.14  24.52 
1999  Survey 
All  sample  households  61,796  40.43  4.22  26.52  28.83 
Non­farm  households  50,120  59.49  6.08  26.55  7.88 
Owner  farm  households  72,527  31.83  1.78  29.64  36.74 
Owner­cum­tenant  farm  hh.  84,513  20.17  2.96  28.04  48.84 
Pure  tenant  farm  hh.  53,548  40.69  7.94  15.49  35.88 
Notes: 
#  Mean  of  the  sum  of  the  four  sources  of  household  income  is  shown.  It  is  denoted  in  nominal 
Pakistan  Rupees  (US$  1.00  =  Rs.  33.57  during  the  1996  survey’s  reference  period  and  46.79  during 
the  1999  survey’s  reference  period). 
(1)  The  sample  for  Panel  A  of  this  table  is  those  household  members  who  are  working  (including 
household  work)  and  whose  age  is  15  years  and  above. 
(2)  Employment  status  in  Panel  A  was  accorded  to  each  worker  based  on  his/her  primary  jobs.  Ap­
proximately  12%  of  these  workers  reported  their  secondary  jobs  in  1996. 
(3)  Household  income  is  deﬁned  as  the  sum  of  the  income  from  self­employed  activities,  wage/salary/ 
allowances  from  employed  household  members,  net  transfer  receipt  (public  and  private),  net  remit­
tances  receipt,  and  other  unearned  income.  The  numbers  reported  in  this  table  cover  only  the  ﬁrst 
two  categories.  The  sum  of  the  last  three  categories  is  equivalent  to  11.9%  (1996)  and  21.6%  (1999) 
of  the  total  reported  in  this  table. 
(4)  The  income  of  self­employed  activities  in  agriculture  includes  the  value  of  farm  produce  consumed 
by  the  same  household.  In  other  words,  they  are  deﬁned  as  the  sum  of  gross  values  of  total  farm 
produce  minus  the  sum  of  actually­paid  expenses  (intermediate  goods,  hired  labor,  hired  machin­
ery,  hired  capital,  and  rented  land).  Since  livestock  production  is  an  important  secondary  job  for 
all  categories  of  households,  the  percentage  of  self­employed  agricultural  income  is  positive  even  for 
non­farm  households.  Since  landlords  in  the  study  region  usually  take  part  in  the  farm  management 
of  tenants,  land  rent  income  is  also  included  in  self­employed  agricultural  income. 
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Table  3:  Human  Capital  Characteristics  of  Working  Males 
1996  Survey 
Total  Employee 





Mean  age  35.99  31.25  38.02  33.64  42.52 
Mean  schooling  years  3.68  4.94  1.90  4.28  2.19 
Literacy  rates  (%)  42.9  53.8  25.9  51.3  29.2 
1999  Survey 
Mean  age 
Mean  schooling  years 

















(1)  The  sample  is  the  male  subset  shown  in  Table  2. 
(2)  “Schooling  years”  are  measured  in  standardized  years,  in  which  each  level  of  completed  education 
is  allocated  a  single  number  of  years  corresponding  to  the  standard  education  system  in  Pakistan. 
(3)  For  the  total  working  males,  age  is  distributed  between  15  and  80  with  standard  deviation  (s.d.) 
15.11  in  1996;  between  15  and  83  with  s.d.  15.12  in  1999.  Schooling  year  is  distributed  between  0 
and  16  with  s.d.  4.63  in  1996;  between  0  and  16  with  s.d.  4.67  in  1999. 
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Table  4:  Estimation  Results  of  the  Multinomial  Logit  Model 
(Model  A:  Using  Educational  Stage) 
Marginal  eﬀects  on  the  probability  of  choosing  j: 
j  = 0  j  = 1  j  = 2  j  = 3  j  = 4 
(household  (non­farm  (farm  (non­farm  (farm 
work)  wage)  wage)  self­emp.)  self­emp.) 
Intercept 
Human  capital  variables 
D  primary 
D  middle 
D  high 
Age 
Age2/100 
Household  asset  variables 
Adult  males  # 
Hh  size  # 
D  land 
Land  size  # 
AssetsV&E  # 
Livestock  # 
Village  ﬁxed  eﬀects 
Village  B 











































­0.149  ­0.154 
0.041  ­0.031 
0.061  ­0.101 
0.021  ­0.228 
0.000  ­0.003 
0.000  0.012 
­0.023  ­0.042 
0.034  ­0.011 
­0.008  0.221 
0.000  0.049 
0.000  ­0.010 
­0.025  0.085 
0.064  0.024 
0.062  0.080 
Log­likelihood  ­1620.33 
LR  statistics  for  zero  slope  593.14 
Notes: 
(1)  Variables  with  #  are  standardized  as  (X  ­ mean)/standard  deviation. 
(2)  Only  those  explanatory  variables  whose  γj  is  statistically  signiﬁcant  at  least  10%  for  some  j  are 
included.  Full  regression  results  including  individual  parameter  estimates  of  γj  on  Xi  and  Xh  and 
its  standard  errors  are  available  on  request. 
(3)  LR  statistics  for  zero  slope  is  statistically  signiﬁcant  at  1%  level  both  for  Model  A  and  Model  B. 
(4)  The  sample  is  the  male  subset  shown  in  Table  2.  Therefore,  the  number  of  observations  is  1,635. 
(5)  See  Appendix  1  for  the  deﬁnition  of  regression  variables. 
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Table  4:  Estimation  Results  of  the  Multinomial  Logit  Model  (continued) 
(Model  B:  Using  Schooling  Years) 
Marginal  eﬀects  on  the  probability  of  choosing  j: 
j  = 0  j  = 1  j  = 2  j  = 3  j  = 4 
(household  (non­farm  (farm  (non­farm  (farm 
work)  wage)  wage)  self­emp.)  self­emp.) 
Intercept 





Household  asset  variables 
Adult  males  # 
Hh  size  # 
D  land 
Land  size  # 
AssetsV&E  # 
Livestock  # 
Village  ﬁxed  eﬀects 
Village  B 








































­0.145  ­0.166 
0.006  0.004 
0.000  ­0.002 
0.000  ­0.003 
0.000  0.011 
­0.024  ­0.040 
0.034  ­0.010 
­0.007  0.221 
­0.001  0.051 
0.000  ­0.010 
­0.023  0.087 
0.063  0.028 
0.061  0.084 
Log­likelihood  ­1617.61 
LR  statistics  for  zero  slope  598.57 
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Table  5:  Estimation  Results  of  the  Non­Agricultural  Wage  Equation  for  Males 
Model  A:  Model  B:  Model  C: 
Using  edu­ Using  school­ With  employ­
cational  stage  ing  year  ment  type 
Coeﬀ.  t­stat  Coeﬀ.  t­stat  Coeﬀ.  t­stat 
Intercept  6.002  32.510  ***  6.097  33.659  ***  6.239  30.658  *** 
Dummy  for  1999  ­0.271  ­7.137  ***  ­0.273  ­7.178  ***  ­0.310  ­5.911  *** 
Human  capital  variables 
D  primary  0.154  2.334  **  0.107  1.686  * 
D  middle  0.268  4.018  ***  0.189  2.973  *** 
D  high  0.494  6.629  ***  0.299  4.993  *** 
Schooling  0.0182  1.362 
Schooling2  0.0021  1.826  * 
Age  0.068  8.364  ***  0.065  8.068  ***  0.059  7.649  *** 
Age2/100  ­0.081  ­7.276  ***  ­0.077  ­6.942  ***  ­0.063  ­6.162  *** 
Employment  type 
D  permanent  0.474  8.570  *** 
Selection  correction  term  0.528  3.919  ***  0.451  3.433  ***  0.211  1.801  * 
R2  0.236  0.244  0.327 
¯  R2  0.230  0.238  0.320 
Hausman  test  statistics  χ2(7)  11.51  χ2(6)  8.31  χ2(8)  13.55 
Notes:  (1)  ***  signiﬁcant  at  1%,  **  at  5%,  *  at  10%  (two­sided  test). 
(2)  Estimated  by  an  unbalanced  panel  method  with  random  household  eﬀects. 
(3)  The  sample  is  the  subset  of  the  male  household  members  described  in  Table  2,  who  work  in  the 
non­agricultural  sector  as  employees.  One  sample  is  deleted  since  its  wage  information  is  incomplete. 
Therefore,  the  number  of  observations  is  841. 
(4)  The  dependent  variable  is  natural  log  of  Non­ag.  wage.  See  Appendix  1  for  the  deﬁnition  of 
regression  variables. 
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Table  6:  Estimation  Results  of  the  Agricultural  Wage  Equation  for  Males 
Model  A:  Model  B: 
Using  educational  stage  Using  schooling  year 
Coeﬀ.  t­stat  Coeﬀ.  t­stat 
Intercept  6.700  16.229  ***  6.656  16.142  *** 
Dummy  for  1999  ­0.325  ­3.394  ***  ­0.330  ­3.471  *** 
Human  capital  variables 
D  primary  0.185  2.638  *** 
D  middle  0.017  0.200 
D  high  0.090  0.526 
Schooling  0.0679  2.420  ** 
Schooling2  ­0.0073  ­2.141  ** 
Age  0.026  2.707  ***  0.028  2.858  *** 
Age2/100  ­0.031  ­2.782  ***  ­0.033  ­2.913  *** 
Selection  correction  term  0.152  1.074  0.166  1.181 
R2  0.297  0.292 
¯  R2  0.232  0.236 
Hausman  test  statistics  χ2(7)  10.23  χ2(6)  10.68 
Notes:  (1),  (2)  see  Table  5. 
(3)  The  sample  is  the  subset  of  the  male  household  members  described  in  Table  2,  who  work  in  the 
agricultural  sector  as  employees.  Therefore,  the  number  of  observations  is  83. 
(4)  The  dependent  variable  is  natural  log  of  Agri.  wage.  See  Appendix  1 for  the  deﬁnition  of  regression 
variables. 
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Table  7:  Estimation  Results  of  the  Non­Farm  Enterprises  Production  Model 
Model  A:  Model  B: 
Without  business  type  With  business  type 
Coeﬀ.  t­stat  Coeﬀ.  t­stat 
Intercept  3.150  3.990  ***  3.245  4.168  *** 
Dummy  for  1999  ­0.238  ­0.928  ­0.119  ­0.458 
Basic  production  factors 
log  of  Labor  N  0.708  11.322  ***  0.688  11.029  *** 
log  of  Capital  N  0.127  4.463  ***  0.136  4.777  *** 
Human  capital  variables 
Education  of  family  labor  in  the  household  business 
Sn  primary  0.100  0.812  0.044  0.352 
Sn  middle  0.328  2.465  **  0.284  2.141  ** 
Sn  high  0.558  4.132  ***  0.452  3.212  *** 
Household  experience 
Head’s  age  ­0.029  ­1.612  ­0.032  ­1.827  * 
(Head’s  age)2/100  0.031  1.798  *  0.034  2.030  ** 
Business  type 
D  busi.space  0.211  2.275  ** 
Selection  correction  term  ­0.006  ­0.063  ­0.009  ­0.090 
R2  0.635  0.648 
¯  R2  0.614  0.626 
Hausman  test  statistics  χ2(9)  12.17  χ2(10)  12.36 
Notes:  (1)  see  Table  5. 
(2)  Dependent variable  is  natural  log  of  Q N  (value­added  of  non­farm  enterprise).  NOB=170.  See 
Appendix  1  for  deﬁnition  of  variables. 
(3)  Estimated  by  a  2SLS  unbalanced  panel  method  with  random  household  eﬀects.  Basic  factors  are 
replaced  by  their  ﬁtted  values  using  other  right­hand­side  variables,  the  acreage  of  agricultural  land 
owned  by  the  household,  the  number  of  adult  males,  the  net  value  of  household  assets  (transportation 
and  durable  consumption  goods),  and  the  value  of  livestock  (both  levels  and  logs)  as  instruments. 
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Table  8:  Estimation  Results  of  Wheat  Production  Model 
Model  A:  Model  B: 
Using  educational  stage  Using  literacy 
Coeﬀ.  t­stat  Coeﬀ.  t­stat 
5.462  10.469  ***  5.469  10.492  *** 
0.098  0.736  0.099  0.748 
0.261  3.845  ***  0.261  3.846  *** 
0.598  7.734  ***  0.597  7.730  *** 
0.112  0.909 
0.080  0.515 
0.133  0.973 
0.111  1.216 
0.003  0.273  0.003  0.252 
­0.003  ­0.224  ­0.002  ­0.200 
1.076  9.161  ***  1.072  9.181  *** 
0.430  3.304  ***  0.429  3.308  *** 
­0.003  ­0.042  ­0.002  ­0.020 
Intercept 
Dummy  for  1999 
Basic  production  factors 
log  of  Labor W 
log  of  Land W 
Human  capital  variables 
Education  of  family  farm  labor 
Sf  primary 
Sf  middle 
Sf  high 
Sf  literacy 
Household  experience 
Head’s  age 
(Head’s  age)2/100 
Control  variables  for  production 
Irrigation 
SC W  *  (Village  A  Dummy) 
Selection  correction  term 
R2  0.489  0.488 
¯  R2  0.470  0.474 
Hausman  test  statistics  χ2(11)  7.86  χ2(9)  8.11 
Notes:  (1)  see  Table  5. 
(2)  Dependent  variable  is  log  of  Q W  (wheat value­added).  NOB=323.  See  Appendix  1  for  the 
deﬁnition  of  variables. 
(3)  Estimated  by  a  2SLS  unbalanced  panel  method  with  random  household  eﬀects.  Basic  factors  and 
SC W  are  replaced  by  their  ﬁtted  values  using  instrument variables  listed  in  note  (3)  of  Table  7. 
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Table  9:  Estimation  Results  of  Crop  Production  Model 
Model  A:  Model  B: 
Using  educational  stage  Using  literacy 
Coeﬀ.  t­stat  Coeﬀ.  t­stat 
5.712  12.746  ***  5.713  12.776  *** 
0.014  0.200  0.010  0.143 
0.276  6.417  ***  0.277  6.472  *** 
0.498  9.955  ***  0.499  10.042  *** 
0.201  1.565 
0.299  1.886  * 
0.289  2.151  ** 
0.256  2.837  *** 
0.002  0.171  0.002  0.133 
­0.006  ­0.543  ­0.006  ­0.508 
1.809  13.658  ***  1.813  13.796  *** 
0.522  3.347  ***  0.517  3.327  *** 
­0.128  ­1.505  ­0.127  ­1.491 
Intercept 
Dummy  for  1999 
Basic  production  factors 
log  of  Labor F 
log  of  Land F 
Human  capital  variables 
Education  of  family  farm  labor 
Sf  primary 
Sf  middle 
Sf  high 
Sf  literacy 
Household  experience 
Head’s  age 
(Head’s  age)2/100 
Control  variables  for  production 
Irrigation 
SC F  *  (Village  A  Dummy) 
Selection  correction  term 
R2  0.601  0.601 
¯  R2  0.590  0.592 
Hausman  test  statistics  χ2(11)  10.73  χ2(9)  10.69 
Notes:  (1)  see  Table  5. 
(2)  Dependent  variable  is  log  of  Q F (value­added  from  all  crops  combined).  NOB=413.  See  Appendix 
1  for  the  deﬁnition  of  variables. 
(3)  Estimated  by  a  2SLS  unbalanced  panel  method  with  random  household  eﬀects.  Basic  factors  and 
SC F  are  replaced  by  their  ﬁtted  values  using  instrument variables  listed  in  note  (3)  of  Table  7. 
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Table  10:  Observed  and  Simulated  Labor  Allocation 
Simulated  labor  force  allocation 
Observed  labor  force  allocation  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  Total 
1996  Survey 
(1)  Non­agricultural  wage  203  37 62 81  383 
(2)  Agricultural  wage  35  6  8 9  58 
(3)  Non­agricultural  self­employment  1  0  77  0  78 
(4)  Agricultural  self­employment  74  16  44  150  284 
Total  313  59  191  240  803 
1999  Survey 
(1)  Non­agricultural  wage  214  12  88  145  459 
(2)  Agricultural  wage  13  2  4 6  25 
(3)  Non­agricultural  self­employment  6  0  106  13  125 
(4)  Agricultural  self­employment  14  2  46  138  200 
Total  247  16  244  302  809 
Notes:  Bold  face  ﬁgures  show  correct  predictions. 
40 Appendix  1:  Deﬁnitions  and  Statistics  of  Empirical  Variables 
Name  Deﬁnition 
A.  Individual  Level  Variables  for  the  Multinomial  Logit  and  Wage  Regression 
D  primary  Dummy  variable  for  those  with  education  up  to  primary  level 
D  middle  Dummy  variable  for  those  with  education  up  to  middle  level 
D  high  Dummy  variable  for  those  with  education  up  to  high  school  or  higher  level 
Schooling  Standardized  years  of  completed  education 
Age  Age  of  the  person 
Non­ag.  wage  Monthly  non­agricultural  wage  or  salary  actually  paid  to  a  worker  (1996  Rs.) 
D permanent  Dummy  variable  for  those  employed  regularly  in  non­agriculture 
Agri.  wage  Monthly  agricultural  wage  actually  paid  to  a  worker  (1996  Rs.) 
B.  Household  Level  Variables 
B.1.  Applicable  to  All  Households 
Adult  males  Number  of  male  household  members  whose  age  is  15  or  above

Hh  size  Number  of  household  members  living  together

D  land  Dummy  variable  for  households  owning  land

Land  size  Land  owned  by  the  household  in  jaribs  (about  0.5  acre)

AssetsV&E  Value  of  transportation  vehicles  and  electric  appliances  owned  (1000  Rs.)

Livestock  Value  of  livestock owned  by  the  household  (1000  Rs.)

Head’s  age  Age  of  the  household  head

B.2.  Additional  Variables  for  Non­Farm  Enterprise  Value­Added  Models 
Sn  primary	 Share  of  persons  whose  education  is  up  to  primary  level  in  those  household  mem­
bers  engaged  in  self­employed  non­farm  business 
Sn  middle	 Share  of  persons  whose  education  is  up  to  middle  level  in  those  household  members 
engaged  in  self­employed  non­farm  business 
Sn  high	 Share  of  persons  whose  education  is  higher  than  middle  level  in  those  household 
members  engaged  in  self­employed  non­farm  business 
Q N	 Total  annual  value­added  from  non­farm  enterprises  (1996  Rs) 
Labor N	 Total  labor  input  evaluated  at  village  wages  (1996  Rs) 
Capital N	 Total  capital  used  in  production  approximated  by  the  machinery/equipment  de­
preciation  and  land  rents  (1996  Rs) 
D  busi.space	 Dummy  variable  for  those  with  a  permanent  business  space 
B.3.  Additional  Variables  for  Farm  Value­Added  Models 
Sf  primary	 Share  of  persons  whose  education  is  up  to  primary  level  in  those  household  mem­
bers  engaged  in  self­employed  agriculture 
Sf  middle	 Share  of  persons  whose  education  is  up  to  middle  level  in  those  household  members 
engaged  in  self­employed  agriculture 
Sf  high	 Share  of  persons  whose  education  is  higher  than  middle  level  in  those  household 
members  engaged  in  self­employed  agriculture 
Sf  literacy	 Share  of  literate  persons  in  those  household  members  engaged  in  self­employed 
agriculture 
Irrigation	 Share  of  farmland  under  irrigation 
Q F	 Total  value­added  of  all  crops  grown  on  the  farm  [gross  value  of  production  minus 
costs  of  seeds,  manure,  fertilizer,  and  chemicals]  (1996  Rs) 
Labor F	 Total  labor  input  in  crop  production  evaluated  at  village  wages  (1996  Rs) 
Land F	 Total  land  used  for  crop  production  in  “jarib” 
SC F	 Share  of  Land F  under  sharecropping  arrangement 
Q W	 Total  value­added  of  wheat  [gross  value  of  production  minus  costs  of  seeds,  manure, 
fertilizer,  and  chemicals]  (1996  Rs) 
Labor W	 Total  labor  input  in  wheat  production  evaluated  at  village  wages  (1996  Rs) 
Land W	 Total  land  used  for  wheat  production  in  “jarib” 
SC W	 Share  of  Land W  under  sharecropping  arrangement 
41
Appendix  1:  Deﬁnitions  and  Statistics  of  Empirical  Variables  (continued) 
Name  NOB  Mean  Std.Dev.  Min.  Max. 
A.  Individual  Level  Variables  for  the  Multinomial  Logit  and  Wage  Regression 
D  primary  1635 
D  middle  1635 
D  high  1635 
Schooling  1635 
Age  1635 
Non­ag.  wage  841 
D permanent  841 
Agri.  wage  83 




















0  16 
15  87 
75.13  40000 
0 1 
150  5000 
B.1.  Applicable  to  All  Households 
Adult  males  707  2.878  1.895  0  18 
Hh  size  707  9.301  5.251  1  45 
D  land  707  0.518  0.500  0  1 
Land  size  707  5.756  21.302  0  300 
AssetsV&E  707  11.964  51.824  0  952 
Land  size  707  12.834  24.395  0  435 
Head’s  age  707  50.92  16.28  16  105 
B.2.  Additional  Variables  for  Non­Farm  Enterprise  Value­Added  Models 
Sn  primary  170 
Sn  middle  170 
Sn  high  170 
Q N  170 
Labor N  170 
Capital N  170 


















3250  299500 
2240  129600 
70  60000 
0 1 
B.3.  Additional  Variables  for  Farm  Value­Added  Models 
Sf  primary  413  0.117  0.292  0  1 
Sf  middle  413  0.080  0.243  0  1 
Sf  high  413  0.121  0.294  0  1 
Sf  literacy  413  0.318  0.426  0  1 
Irrigation  413  0.465  0.395  0  1 
Q  F  413  23175  30933  260  352440 
Labor  F  413  4322  6314  50  87991 
Land  F  413  8.091  9.199  0.25  90 
SC  F  413  0.303  0.427  0  1 
Q  W  323  9331  12153  90  123112 
Labor  W  323  1624  2073  41.25  14742 
Land  W  323  4.994  5.757  0.25  40 
SC  W  323  0.327  0.452  0  1 
Notes: 
(1)  Monetary  variables  are  in  1996  Pakistani  Rupees,  which  are  deﬂated  by  rural  CPI. 
(2)  In  Panel  B,  households  with  negative  value­added  were  excluded  from  production  function  anal­
ysis. 
42
Appendix  2.  On  Attrition  Bias 
Let  the  indicator  variable  di  = 1  if  yi2  is  observed  in  period  2  and  di  = 0  otherwise.  Suppose  that  yi2 
is  observed  if  the  latent  variable 
d∗ =  γRi  +  �i  ≥ 0,  (15) i 
where  Ri  is  a  vector  of  variables  including  Zi  and  other  identifying  variables  Wi  and  �i  is  a  standard 
normal  error.  Then  the  probability  of  non­attrition  is  a  probit  function  given  by 
Prob(di  = 1)  = Φ(γRi),  (16) 
where  Φ(.) is  the  standard  normal  distribution  function.  The  probit  model  was  estimated  by maximum 
likelihood,  yielding  the  following  table.  Results  show  that  attrition  occurred  more  on  households  living 
in  Village  A  than  in  Villages  B  and  C  and  on  households  whose  heads  were  more  educated.  Other 
household  attributes  are  not  statistically  signiﬁcant. 
Coef.  S.E.  dP/dX 
Village  dummies 
Village  A  0.749  (0.260)***  0.156 
Village  B  1.945  (0.307)***  0.406 
Village  C  1.404  (0.262)**  0.293 
Household’s  initial  attributes 
Household  size  ­0.075  (0.142)  ­0.016 
Dependency  ratio  0.047  (0.084)  0.010 
Head’s  age  ­0.014  (0.102)  ­0.003 
Dummy  for  nonfarm  fulltime  employees  ­0.045  (0.189)  ­0.009 
Dummy  for  regular  remittance  receipt  ­0.387  (0.337)  ­0.081 
D  land  ­0.114  (0.205)  ­0.024 
Land  size  0.319  (0.506)  0.066 
Livestock  value  0.197  (0.207)  0.041 
Net  monetary  asset  ­0.022  (0.125)  ­0.005 
Other  asset  value  0.388  (0.389)  0.081 
Education  of  household  head  ­0.201  (0.091)**  ­0.042 
Number  of  observations  355 
Log  likelihood  ­133.4 
LR  test  for  zero  slopes  42.70  *** 
Fraction  of  correct  prediction  0.848 
Notes:  Standard  errors  were  computed  from  analytical  second  derivatives.  Continuous  variables  in 
‘Households’  initial  attributes’  are  normalised  by  their  village  means  and  standard  errors. 
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